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Abstract
Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be
taken by simple majority. Individuals have different, privately observed intensities of
preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for money. We study
the implication of such trading for outcomes and welfare when trades are coordinated by
the two group leaders and when they take place anonymously in a competitive market.
The theory has strong predictions. In both cases, trading falls short of full efficiency,
but for opposite reasons: with group leaders, the minority wins too rarely; with market
trades, the minority wins too often. As a result, with group leaders, vote trading improves
over no-trade; with market traades, vote trading can be welfare reducing. All predictions
are strongly supported by experimental results.
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1 Introduction
Imagine a group collectively choosing between two alternatives through majority
voting. Suppose that before voting all votes can be freely traded for money: indi-
viduals feeling strongly about the decision can buy votes from those who are less
concerned about the outcome. To concentrate on vote trading per se, suppose also
that none of the voters is budget constrained so that they all can express the intensity
of their preferences through the price they are willing to pay. In this scenario, where
inequality and credit constraints do not play a role, is vote trading a good idea?
There are at least three reasons why the question is interesting. First, as is well-
known, majority voting fails to account for the intensity of preferences: a lukewarm
majority will win over an intense minority. How can the minority be protected not
only in its rights, which can be safeguarded by the courts, but also in the expression
of its strongest preferences? Second, economic theory teaches that markets typically
work well in allocating goods to those who most value them. It is natural to ask
whether this insight extends to votes. More than a natural curiosity, it is a funda-
mental question in political economy. Third, markets for votes exist beyond the hazy
interiors of smoke-lled rooms. Corporate shares are traded in markets and come
not only with rights to dividends and future prots, but also to votes. Di¤erent
classes of shares exist, with di¤erent voting rights. To what extent does the inherent
trading of votes a¤ect share prices and trades? It is di¢ cult to answer this question
without understanding the fundamental forces operating in a market for votes.1
It is not surprising, then, that questions about vote markets, whether mediated
by money or by promises of future support (log-rolling), intrigued the early schol-
ars in modern political economy: Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Coleman (1966,
1967), Park (1967), Wilson (1969), Tullock (1970), Haefele (1971), Kadane (1972),
Riker and Brams (1973), Mueller (1973), Bernholtz (1973, 1974).2 Writing in 1974,
however, Ferejohn summarized the sad state of knowledge on the subject succinctly:
"[W]e really know very little theoretically about vote trading. We cannot be sure
about when it will occur, or how often, or what sort of bargains will be made. We
dont know if it has any desirable normative or e¢ ciency properties" (p. 25).
The crux of the problem is that votes have characteristics that make them very
1See for example, Demichelis and Ritzberger (2007) and Dhillon and Rossetto (2011) and the
references they cite.
2The papers had di¤erent methodological approaches (for example, cooperative versus non-
cooperative games; or log-rolling versus markets for votes) and often focused on specic examples.
McKelvey and Ordeshook (1980) report a laboratory experiment that studies the Riker and Brams
(1973) logrolling example.
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di¤erent from standard goods. Votes are indivisible and intrinsically worthless; their
value depends on the inuence they provide on the group decision-making, and there-
fore on the holdings of votes by all other individuals. Thus, demands are interde-
pendent, and payo¤s discontinuous at the point at which a voter becomes pivotal.
These unique features pose a major theoretical obstacle to understanding vote trad-
ing. Both in a market for votes and in log-rolling games, equilibrium and other
stability concepts such as the core typically fail to exist. Ferejohns early observa-
tion was echoed in later works (Schwartz (1977, 1981), Shubik and van der Heyden
(1978), Weiss (1988), Philipson and Snyder (1996)), and with very few exceptions
(Piketty (1994), Kultti and Salonen (2005)), the theoretical interest in voters trading
votes among themselves e¤ectively came to an end.
The goal of this paper is to make some progress in addressing these obstacles,
both theoretically and experimentally. To do so, we build on two existing con-
tributions, one based on general equilibrium theory and one based on mechanism
design theory. Following a general equilibrium approach, Casella et al. (2011) has
reopened the debate on competitive vote markets by proposing the concept of Ex
Ante Competitive Equilibrium: a market price and demands such that each indi-
vidual is maximizing his expected utility and the market clears in expectation. Ex
ante competitive equilibrium overcomes the non-convexity of markets for votes and
the discontinuity of demand caused by pivotality by allowing individuals to express
mixedi.e. probabilisticdemands. Realized demands will not clear the market ex
post, but the equilibrium concept retains the discipline of competitive equilibrium
by requiring that deviations from market clearing be unsystematic and unexpected:
in the spirit of rational expectations, the expected deviation from market clearing
is zero. Casella et al. show that an equilibrium exists when both the direction and
the intensity of otherspreferences are not known. In this paper we show, for the
group sizes explored in the experimental design, that an ex ante equilibrium contin-
ues to exist when the size of the two opposing groups is known. The extension is not
trivial: it has been argued, plausibly, that in markets for votes equilibrium existence
problems should be worse when information about the direction of preferences is
available (Piketty (1994)). The concept of ex ante equilibrium, however, extends to
such settings. We nd that in equilibrium the direction of preferences is revealed,
and the competition for votes becomes a competition for dictatorship between the
highest-intensity member of the majority and the highest-intensity member of the
minority. The frequency of minority victories then reects the relative intensity of
the most intense minority member, without taking into account the smaller size of
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the minority and the aggregate group values. As a result, relative to utilitarian e¢ -
ciency the minority wins too often. As in Casella et al., the bias can be strong enough
that ex ante welfare is lower with a vote market than in the absence of trade.3
In the literature, an alternative response to Ferejohns negative conclusion has
been to model vote trading agreements as mediated either by a market-maker or
by party leaders.4 Koford (1982) and Philipson and Snyder (1996) both conclude
that vote trading through a market-maker improves welfare. Their models, however,
rely on auxiliary assumptions that play a large role in the result.5 We argue in this
paper that centralized vote trading closely resembles a bilateral bargain between the
leaders of the two opposing groups. Viewed from this perspective, one can directly
apply results from the mechanism design literature on bilateral bargaining. As long
as the other groups preferences are not commonly known, in general vote trading
through party leaders cannot be fully e¢ cient. Absent trade, the majority "owns"
the decision: the scenario is isomorphic to bilateral trading between a seller and
a buyer when preferences are private information. Hence we know, from Myerson
and Satterthwaite (1983)s seminal theorem, that in the absence of outside subsi-
dies, there is no incentive compatible mechanism that guarantees e¢ cient trade and
voluntary participation. There is too little trade, and the minority wins too rarely.
However, because the minority never wins in the absence of trade, we conrm the
conclusion in the literature: trading through party leaders has higher ex ante welfare
than no trade.
There is one special case in which vote trading mediated by party-leaders can be
fully e¢ cient: when the two parties have equal size, and ties are broken by a fair
coin toss. In the absence of vote trading, each group expects to win the decision
with probability one-half. The environment is then isomorphic to the Cramton, et
al. (1987) model of e¢ cient dissolution of an equal partnership. Hence there exist
optimal auctions guaranteed to transfer ownership of the partnership to the partner
valuing it most and such that all agents will enter the auction voluntarily.
3Kultti and Salonen (2005) also conclude that the Walrasian approach to vote markets requires
allowing for mixed demands. They do not impose any market clearing condition and study a model
where trade is e¢ cient by assumption.
4A di¤erent literature studies vote-buying by either candidates or lobbyists: for example, My-
erson (1993), Groseclose and Snyder (1996), Dal Bò (2007), Dekel, Jackson and Wolinsky (2008)
and (2009). We focus instead on vote-buying within the committee (or the electorate). The agents
buying or selling votes are the voters themselves, acting either independently or through their
leaders.
5Philipson and Snyder assume that only trades that are unanimously preferred to no-trade by
all members of the two parties are allowed to take place. Koford assumes that the two party leaders
cooperate in maximizing their memberssurplus.
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We conduct a series of laboratory experiments to explore both approaches - i.e.,
both a competitive market for votes, and vote trading through party leaders, and in
this case with groups of equal and unequal size. For market trading, the experimental
methodology on competitive markets for goods and assets has developed a widely
accepted design: a continuous open-book double auction in which consumers and
producers post prices and are matched (Smith, 1965,1982; Forsythe, Palfrey and
Plott 1982; Gray and Plott, 1990, and Davis and Holt, 1992). In experiments, this
market design has regularly been found to induce behavior that approximates closely
the theoretical competitive market (for example, Friedman 1984, 1993). In a market
for votes, the asymmetric position of consumers and producers is missing, and we
simplify the design by allowing only bids for buying votes. To ensure that the results
are comparable, we use the same design to study both trading through the market
and trading with party leaders. In this latter case, the experimental design comes to
approximate closely well-known auction games from bilateral bargaining theory.
Our main predictions can be summarized in three main points: (1) Relative to
majority voting with no vote trading, e¢ ciency gains exist only when trade is cen-
tralized, i.e. mediated through party leaders. (2) With market trading, there is too
much trade: the minority party reaps signicant benets, but these are outweighed
by the losses incurred by the majority party. (3) While centralized vote trading im-
proves welfare, it can attain full e¢ ciency only if the groups have equal size. If not,
there is too little trade, and the minority benets are too small.
In the experiment, centralized trade with equal size groups falls short of full
e¢ ciency: there are signicant e¢ ciency gains and the frequency of trade is higher
than with di¤erent sizes, but the gains are not fully exploited. All other predictions,
however, are satised in every experimental session. In particular, the opposite
source of ine¢ ciency when votes are traded in the market, as opposed to bargained
between the group leaders emerges very clearly: in every experimental session with
a majority group, the fraction of minority victories is too low when trade occurs
through party leaders, and too high when trade occurs through the market, relative
to the frequency that maximizes realized aggregate payo¤s.
The next section describes the basic model, in the two specications applying to
groups leaders and to competitive trading, and derives the theoretical predictions;
Section 3 describes the experimental design; Section 4 discusses the experimental
results, starting with prices and allocations and concluding with voting outcomes
and welfare; Section 5 concludes.
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2 The Model
A committee of size n must decide between two alternatives, X and Y; and is divided
into two groups with opposite preferences: it is publicly known that M individuals
prefer alternative X, and m prefer alternative Y , with m = n M M . We will use
M and m to indicate not only the size of the two groups, but also the groupsnames.
While the direction of each individuals preference is known, the intensity of such
preference is private information. Intensity is summarized by a value vi representing
the utility that individual i attaches to obtaining his preferred alternative, relative
to the competing one: individual is utility is vi if his preferred alternative is chosen,
and 0 if it is not. Intensity vi is private information, but it is common knowledge
that each vi is drawn independently for each individual from a distribution Fi(v)
atomless and will full support [0; 1].
Each individual has one vote, and the group decision is taken through majority
voting, with ties broken with a coin toss. Prior to voting, however, individuals can
purchase or sell votes among themselves for money: a trade is an actual transfer of
the vote and of all rights to its use. Individual utility ui is given by:
ui = viI + ti (1)
where I equals 1 if is preferred decision is chosen and 0 otherwise, and ti is is net
monetary transfer, which can be positive, if i is a net seller of votes, or negative,
if he is a net buyer. Each individual makes his trading and voting choices so as to
maximize his expectation of (1). In all that follows, we dene as e¢ cient the decision
that maximizes the sum of realized utilities, or, equivalently, the decision preferred
by the group of voters with higher total values.
With two alternatives and a single voting decision, voting sincerely is always a
weakly dominant strategy, and we restrict our attention to sincere voting equilibria.
Our focus is on the vote trading mechanism, and in particular, we are interested in
two trading arrangements: a competitive spot market for votes, and a scenario where
each group is represented by a leader and trade is restricted to the two leaders. We
begin by studying the latter.
2.1 Trading through group leaders
The literature on vote markets stresses the externalities caused by individual vote
trades on individuals who are not part of the transaction, and considers trade be-
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tween party leaders a more promising route for e¢ ciency gains (for example, Koford,
1982, Philipson and Snyder, 1996). Without specifying the details of the trading
mechanism, the rst question is whether any mechanism exists that always results
in the e¢ cient decision when trade occurs through the two party leaders.
In each group, the leader is the only member authorized to buy or sell votes;
he knows and internalizes the total values of his group, and enforces any compen-
satory transfers within the group, if necessary. Suppose rst that the groups have
di¤erent sizes: M > m. If no vote is traded, the alternative preferred by the ma-
jority is chosen. Thus, lacking trade, the majority leader "owns" the decision. The
model is then identical to Myerson and Satterthwaites (1983) bargaining model,
and the conclusion follows immediately: there is no mechanism that always guar-
antees ex post e¢ ciency and satises incentive compatibility and interim individual
rationality.6 Myerson and Satterthwaite establish that the most e¢ cient, incentive
compatible and interim individually rational mechanism will have too little trade:
without outside subsidies it is impossible to ensure the participation of both group
leaders when the two group values are "too" similar. In our setting, too little trade
too few minority victoriesare expected when the aggregate group values are similar.
With specic trading institutions, vote trading by group leaders may well outperform
simple majority voting, but Myerson and Satterthwaites theorem tells us that it will
fall short of full e¢ ciency.
Suppose then that the groups have equal size: M = m. Without trade, the vote
is tied, and given the random tie-break rule, each group leader expects to win with
probability one-half. With risk-neutrality, each leader "owns" half of the decision.
The problem is isomorphic to the dissolution of an equal share partnership in a
private good, and we know from Cramton et al. (1987) that in this case an e¢ cient,
incentive compatible and interim individually rational bargaining mechanism does
exist.7 If the two groups have equal size, vote trading through the two group leaders
can potentially be e¢ cient.
We summarize these observations in the following remark:
6Note that our assumptions match Myerson and Satterthwaites assumptions: the valuations
draws are independent, and the supports of the distributions of valuations are full and overlap at
least partially. With individual Fi(v) distributed over [0; 1], the supports of the distributions of
valuations for the group leaders, Gp(
P
i2p vi), p 2 fM;mg, are full and must overlap for any size
of the two groups (because both have 0 as lower bound).
7The tie-break rule is important. Cramton et al. show that e¢ cient, incentive compatible and
interim individually rational mechanisms exist for all distributions of valuations when the tie-break
rule is a coin toss, as in our model. As long as there is any randomness in the tie-break rule, the
result holds for some distributions of valuations. If one side wins for sure in case of ties, we are
back to Myerson and Satterthwaites model, and to their impossibility result.
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Remark 1. (Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), and Cramton et al. (1987)).
Suppose all vote trades occur through the two group leaders and the tie break rule is a
coin toss. Then an e¢ cient, incentive compatible, and interim individually rational
trading mechanism exists if and only if M = m. If M 6= m, the most e¢ cient,
incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism has too little trade: the
majority wins too often.
In this paper our interest is not in optimal mechanisms, but in a specic insti-
tution, a market for votes, and in its experimental properties. We need to specify
the details of the trading technology. Di¤erent trading rules are plausible, but the
experimental focus of the paper helps us restrict the theoretical models. The classical
experiments on competitive goods markets are designed as a continuous open-book
auction between buyers and sellers (for example, Smith, 1982, Plott, 1982, Plott and
Smith, 1978). Using this platform is then both desirable per se because it provides
an immediate comparison between goods and votes marketsand has the added ad-
vantage of supplying natural auction models for the case of trading between group
leaders.
When trade occurs exclusively through the groups leaders, the model has two
agents only. The natural unit of trade is the minimum number of votes necessary
to acquire decision power.8 In all cases, we can normalize the object of trade to one
vote without loss of generality.
2.1.1 Two equal-sized groups.
In the case of equal-sized groups, in the absence of trade, either alternative is chosen
with probability 1=2. Here, the continuous auction implemented in market experi-
ments (and in our experimental design) approximates a second-price auction, where
the individual submitting the highest bid acquires one vote from his opponent, but by
barely overbidding him e¤ectively pays the opponents bid. A second price sealed-bid
auction is then the appropriate reference for the experimental results.
Call bi the bid submitted by individual i, and focus on symmetric bidding strate-
gies, such that bi = B(vi). Individual is utility is given by:
ui =

vi   bj if bi > bj
bi if bj > bi
(2)
8A trade of any number of votes either below or above such number has no value or no additional
value.
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and thus his problem is:
max
bi
[E(vi  B(vj)jvj < B 1(bi))F (B 1(bi)) + bi(1  F (B 1(bi)))]
where B 1(bi) = vi. If F is Uniform, as it will be in the experiment, the problem
becomes:
max
bi
"Z B 1(bi)
0
(vi  B(z))dz + bi(1 B 1(bi))
#
with rst order condition:
[vi   2B(vi)] 1
B0(vi)
= vi   1
The di¤erential equation has solution:
B(vi) =
1
(1  vi)2

v3i
3
  v
2
i
2
+ C

The only solution for which the bid remains nite at vi = 1 has C = 1=6. Hence the
equilibrium bidding strategy must be given by:
B(vi) =
1 + 2vi
6
(3)
The properties of the auction are immediate. First, B(vi) is increasing in vi: the
winning bid always belongs to the individual with the highest value, who will thus
acquire the others vote and impose his preferred decision - the mechanism is e¢ cient.
Second, the probability that individual i wins the auction is vi, and thus increases
in individual is value - the mechanism is incentive compatible. Finally, is expected
utility from participating equals
R vi
0
[vi  (1+2vj)=6]dvj+
R 1
vi
[(1+2vi)=6]dvj = 1=6+
v2i =2, always larger than vi=2 - the mechanism is interim individually rational. The
auction is identical to one of the e¢ cient mechanisms for dissolution of a partnership
identied by Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer.
2.1.2 Two unequal-sized groups.
When groups have di¤erent sizes, in the absence of trade, one group owns the de-
cision power. With M > m, the majority leader assumes the role of the seller in
a private market, and the minority leader the role of the buyer. In the continuous
double auction implemented in the experiment, trade occurs only if the bid by group
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m is higher than the value attributed to the decision by groupM . The trading mech-
anism approximates a sealed buyers bid double auction (Satterthwaite and Williams
(1989)), with a single buyer and seller: the seller submits an o¤er, the buyer sub-
mits a bid, and trade occurs, at the buyers bid, if the bid is higher than the o¤er.
Indexing the seller by s and the buyer by b, utilities are given by:
us =

vs if bs > bb
bb if bb > bs
ub =

vb   bb if bs < bb
0 if bs > bb
(4)
The sellers dominant strategy is to bid bs = vs. The buyers problem then is:
max
bb
[(vb   bb)F (bb)] (5)
If F is Uniform over [0; 1], F (bb) = bb, and thus:
bb(vb) =
vb
2
(6)
The trading mechanism is incentive compatible and interim individually rational,
but, as expected, ex post ine¢ cient: trade occurs only if the buyers value is at least
twice the sellers value. With F Uniform, the probability that a trade is concluded is
25 percent, where it should be 50 percent with full e¢ ciency; expected ex ante welfare
is 94 percent of expected welfare under full e¢ ciency (versus 75 percent without
trade). In our application to vote trading between group leaders, the theoretical
prediction is unambiguous: vote trading is not fully e¢ cient because the majority
wins too often. However, it dominates majority voting without vote trading because
it allows for some minority victories, when the disparity in values is su¢ ciently high.
The mechanism has lower trade and lower expected e¢ ciency than the optimal
Myerson and Satterthwaite mechanism, but the di¤erence is not large. With F
Uniform over [0; 1], the optimal incentive compatible and individually rational mech-
anism can sustain trade whenever vB  vS + 1=4; the probability that a trade is
concluded is then 28 percent, and expected welfare 96 percent of full e¢ ciency. Rel-
ative to the optimal mechanism, the buyers bid auction supports more trade when
the sellers value is less than 1=4, and less trade otherwise. The net result is a welfare
loss, but because the missed trading opportunities occur mostly when the buyers
and the sellers values are not too di¤erent, the quantitative impact is not large.
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2.2 Competitive vote trading
Characterizing the equilibrium and welfare properties of a competitive market for
votes is more challenging. The crucial problem is well-known: there exist no price
and allocation of votes such that the market clears. Call p the market price of a vote,
and di(p) individual is net demand for votes in equilibrium (where di =  1 if i sells
his vote). Then:
Remark 2. (Ferejohn (1974), Philipson and Snyder (1996), Piketty (1994)). If
n > 2, for any M m > 0 and fv1; :::vng, there is no price p such that
P
i di(p) = 0.
The logic is simple. For all p > 0,
P
i2m di(p) 2 f m; (M   m + 1)=2g: if the
aggregate demand of minority voters is positive, it must equal the minimum number
of votes required to win; alternatively, at any positive price all losing votes must
be o¤ered for sale. But
P
i2M di(p)  0: in equilibrium, the aggregate demand by
majority voters cannot be positive. In addition,
P
i2M di(p) 6=  (M  m + 1)=2: if
(M  m + 1)=2 votes were traded, the remaining (M +m   1)=2 votes collectively
held by M voters would be worthless and thus o¤ered for sale too. Thus for all
p > 0,
P
i2m di(p) +
P
i2M di(p) 6= 0. If p = 0,
P
i2m di(p)  (M  m + 1)=29, butP
i2M di(p)   (M  m   1)=2, because the only supply can come from M voters
whose vote is not pivotal. Thus for all p = 0,
P
i2m di(p) +
P
i2M di(p) > 0.
In response to this observation, Casella et al. (2011) develop the concept of ex
ante competitive equilibrium. In an ex ante equilibrium, demand is allowed to be
stochastic, the market clears in expectation only, and a rationing rule determines the
ex post allocation of votes. Call i is mixed demand: i is a discrete probability
distribution over support [ 1; 0; 1; ::; n   1]. Call di the realization of i, and R
a rationing rule establishing how votes are allocated if
P
i di 6= 0. A price p, a
vector of demands , and a rationing rule R constitute an ex ante equilibrium if
Eui(i;  i; R) Eui(ei;  i; R) for all ei, for all i, andP i = 0.10
Casella et al. discuss two anonymous rationing rules, but because the value of
votes can be very discontinuous in the quantity purchased, they focus primarily on a
rationing rule inspired by All-Or-Nothing orders in nancial markets: either a voter
fullls his demand completely or is excluded from trade.11 Because we adopt the
9We are assuming that at p = 0, voters on the losing side demand rather than sell votes. This
is equivalent to the standard assumption that goods are in excess demand at 0 price.
10As in the analysis of competitive equilibrium with externalities (e.g., Arrow and Hahn, 1971,
pp. 132-6), the denition of the equilibrium requires voters to best reply not only to the price but
also to the demands of other voters. Optimal demands are interrelated.
11See the description of AON oders by the New York Stock Exchange
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same rule below, we describe it more precisely: any individual with positive demand
is considered with equal probability; in case his demand cannot be satised, the
voter is left with his initial endowment, and the process goes on to another voter
with positive demand. For such a rationing rule (R1 for ease of reference), Casella
et al. show that an ex ante competitive equilibrium exists in a votes market where
not only the intensity but the direction of voterspreferences is private information.
As expected, in equilibrium votes concentrate in the hands of individuals with high
intensities, but the result is extreme: after trade, it is always the case that either the
highest-intensity voter or, less frequently, the second highest owns a majority of the
votes. The equilibrium price depends on the realization of values, but is always such
that the second highest-value voter is indi¤erent between buying a majority of the
votes and selling his vote. The market equilibrium comes to resemble an auction for
dictatorship.12
One question left open is whether the concept of ex ante competitive equilibrium
can be applied to a market for votes in which the size of the two opposing groups
is known. The literature conjectures informally that in such a case any notion of
competitive equilibrium is doomed by the argument in Remark 2. But consider the
following example:
Example. Imagine a full information scenario where vi = 1 for all i 2 M ,
vi = 2 for all i 2 m, and n = 5. The rationing rule is R1. Then, there exists an
ex ante competitive equilibrium such that one minority voter demands two votes, one
majority voter randomizes between demanding two votes (with probability 2=3) and
selling his vote, and all other voters o¤er to sell. The equilibrium price is p = 1=3.
The statement is veried in Appendix A. Note that with n = 5 controlling three
votes amounts to having full decision power. Thus, not only does an equilibrium
continue to exist, but it replicates closely the result in Casella et al., with the dif-
ference that the competition for dictatorship now takes place between two members
of the opposite groups. Strikingly, equilibrium strategies and price do not depend
on the size of the minority. As a result, there can be no presumption of e¢ ciency:
whether m = 1 and M = 4 (and e¢ ciency dictates a majority victory), or m = 2
and M = 3 (and e¢ ciency dictates a minority victory), with a market for votes the
minority wins with probability 2=3. Nor is the market necessarily superior to no
trade: it is superior if m = 2, but inferior if m = 1.13
http://www.nyse.com/futuresoptions/nysearcaoptions/.
12Casella et al. identify su¢ cient conditions under which the equilibrium is robust to an alterna-
tive rationing rule where each vote on the long side of the market is rationed with equal probability.
13The example assumes that preferences are identical within each group, as in Kullti and Salonen
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The example considers a full information scenario where values are constant
within each group. We are interested in the private information case where the
distribution of values is non-degenerate. In a related paper, we study the equilib-
rium for such a case and generic m and M (n odd).14 Here, framing once again the
theoretical analysis by the experimental design, we focus on the specic values of m
and M employed in the experiment: m = 2, M = 3.
An equilibrium with no trade always exists: if all other voters are neither buying
nor selling, being inactive is an individuals best response. Our interest is in an
equilibrium with trade. We dene:
Denition. An equilibrium is fully revealing if, given others strategies and
price and the knowledge that the market is in a fully revealing equilibrium, each
voters strategy is identical to what it would be if he were fully informed about others
preferences.
In the spirit of rational expectations models (Allen and Jordan, 1998), we call an
equilibrium fully revealing if either: (1) the equilibrium price, together with the set
of othersequilibrium strategies and market equilibrium, fully convey to voter i the
direction of preferences associated to each demand; or (2) the information conveyed
is partial but voter i has a unique best response, identical to his best response under
full information.
Call vg (vg) the maximal (minimal) realized value of a voter in group g, with
g = m, M . Then:
Proposition 1. Suppose M = 3 and m = 2. The rationing rule is R1. Then for
all realizations of fv1; ::; v5g such that vm  vM , a fully revealing ex ante equilibrium
with trade exists. The equilibrium price is always such that min(vm; vM) is indi¤erent
between demanding two votes and selling his vote.
The proposition states that unless every majority member has stronger prefer-
ences than any minority member, an equilibrium with trade exists.15 We prove it by
construction in Appendices A and B. The equilibrium recalls the example presented
above, but to discuss it further, we need to describe it in more detail.
To simplify notation, call g0 the group such that vg0  vg, and call v(2)g0 the second
highest value in group g0. Lemmas 1 to 3 in the Appendices show that the equilibrium
has the following features: (1) If vg > (2=7)v(2)g0, voters vg0 and vg randomize between
(2005), but the requirement of expected market balance leads to very di¤erent equilibrium strategies
and price.
14Casella and Turban (in preparation).
15An equilibrium with trade may exist when vm < vM , but the no-trade equilibrium seems focal
in such a scenario.
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demanding two votes and selling their vote, all other voters o¤er to sell their vote; (2)
If vg 2 [(1=14)v(2)g0 ; (2=7)v(2)g0 ], voters vg0 and vg randomize between demanding two
votes and selling their vote, v(2)g0randomizes between demanding one vote and selling,
all other voters o¤er to sell their vote; (3) Finally, if vg < (1=14)v(2)g0, voters vg0 and
v(2)g0 demand one vote, voter vg randomizes between demanding two votes and selling
his vote, all other voters sell. The randomization probabilities and the equilibrium
price depend on the realization of the vector fv1; ::; v5g. Recall that neither ones
value ranking in the distribution of values nor others individual preferences are
known ex ante, but both are revealed in equilibrium.16
We can rephrase the equilibrium strategies in more intuitive terms. For the great
majority of value realizations, there is an equilibrium where vm and vM randomize
between demanding two votes and selling their vote, and all other voters o¤er to sell
their vote. The two top-value voters in each group compete for dictatorship, and all
others sell. Such an equilibrium always exists when the two highest value voters in
the committee disagree. When that is not the case, the result continues to hold as
long as the distance, in value terms, between the two top voters in the committee
and the highest value voter who disagrees with them is not too large. But even when
this condition is violated, in equilibrium vg, or, with more transparent notation,
min(vm; vM) must be indi¤erent between selling and bidding for dictatorship. If
there is trade, the other members of his group, with weaker preferences, are selling;
thus, if min(vm; vM) buys at all, then he must buy dictatorship.
The equilibrium has interesting implications. The induced competition between
vm and vM implies that in equilibrium there is always a positive probability that
a majority voter demands to buy votes. Thus both intra-group trade and a super-
majority occur with positive probability for all proles of values that support trade.
The need to secure the cooperation of ones weakest allies is not surprising and
routinely observed in political deals, but intra-group trades are absent from all vote-
buying models we are familiar with.17
The description of the equilibrium strategies makes immediately clear that the
equilibrium must fall short of full e¢ ciency. As in the example, individual strate-
gies reect the relative ranking of individual values, but do not capture the aggregate
16As discussed in Appendix B, we have found multiple ex ante equilibria with trade for value
realizations such that vg  (1=4)v(2)g0 . In all such equilibria min(vm; vM ) is indi¤erent between
demanding two votes and selling his vote. We do not know whether the equilibrium (with trade) is
unique when vg > (1=4)v(2)g0 but have not identied any other.
17Groseclose and Snyders (1996) conclusion that vote-buying leads to supermajorities has the
same avor, but their paper studies vote-buying by two competing lobbyists, as opposed to vote
trading in a market, where every voter is potentially a buyer and a seller.
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values of the two groups. If the values are independent draws from a Uniform distrib-
ution, the expected frequency of minority victories in the equilibrium we characterize
is 52.5 percent, while the e¢ cient frequency is 22.5 percent. Relative to full e¢ ciency,
the minority wins too often. Nor is the market superior to no-trade: If values are
distributed uniformly, simulations show that expected ex ante welfare in equilibrium
corresponds to 84.2 percent of ex ante rst best e¢ ciency. In the absence of vote
trading, expected ex ante welfare is 95 percent of full e¢ ciency.18 19
Our main theoretical result, thus, is that vote trading between a majority and
a minority group cannot reach full e¢ ciency, whether or not trading is coordinated
by group leaders. In the presence of group leaders, the minority is expected to win
too rarely, but in the absence of group leaders, the minority is expected to win
too frequently. Because with simple majority voting the minority always loses, vote
trading with group leaders, although not fully e¢ cient, must dominate voting in
the absence of trade. With our parametrization, the opposite holds for vote trading
through the market: the market for votes is inferior to simple majority voting with
no trading.
3 Experimental design
The experiment was run at the Center for Experimental Social Science at NYU
(CESS), and at the Social Science Experimental Laboratory at the California In-
stitute of Technology (SSEL) between June 2007 and February 2009, with enrolled
students recruited from the whole campus through the laboratoriesweb sites. No
subject participated in more than one session. After entering the computer labo-
ratory, the students were seated randomly in booths separated by partitions and
assigned ID numbers corresponding to their computer terminal; the experimenter
then read aloud the instructions, projected views of the computer screens during
18Because the mixing probabilities depend on the exact realizations of the values, we calculated
expected welfare in equilibrium by averaging the results of a 100,000 independent realizations of
the vector of value draws. As stated in the previous footnote, in the market for votes there are
multiple ex ante equilibria if vg  (1=4)v(2)g0 . But the frequency of such value realizations is so low
that all the numbers are unchanged, up to the rst decimal point, for any of the equilibria we have
found. The observation holds for all numbers cited in the paper on the theoretical predictions of
market trading, and we do not repeat it below.
19The numbers are not immediately comparable to those computed in the case of party leaders
because in the auction the buyer and the seller are each assumed to draw a single value distributed
uniformly. If the sellers value is instead the sum of three independent draws from a Uniform
distribution, and the buyers value the sum of two, then expected ex ante equilibrium welfare in
the auction equals 96.5 percent of ex ante rst best e¢ ciency.
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the experiment, and answered all questions publicly. Each session of the experi-
ment amounted to 25 paid rounds, preceded by one unpaid practice round. Each
experimental session consisted of a single treatment.
In the experiment, the two groups were called X and Y , from the name of the
preferred alternative. In each round, subjects were matched randomly in committees
and assigned either to group X or to group Y . The size of the two groups was
commonly known. Each subject i was told by the computer whether he belonged to
group X or group Y , and the value vi he would win if his preferred policy prevailed.
Values were expressed in experimental points, and subjects knew that values were
drawn randomly by the computer, independently and privately for each subject, and
could assume any integer value between 1 and 100, with equal probability.
After values were assigned, the market for votes opened. Each subject started
the session with an initial endowment of 200 points, to be paid back at the end of the
experiment. Any subject could post a bid specifying the price he was willing to pay
for a vote; the bid appeared on all committee membersmonitors, together with the
name of the group the bidder belonged to and a running tally of the votes belonging
to each group.20 If anyone accepted the bid, the transaction was concluded; if not,
anyone could post a new bid, higher than the previous one. After each trade, a
new bid could be posted, at any value. The market for votes was open for three
minutes, during which as many transactions were concluded as there were accepted
bids.21 Two observations on the experimental market should be added. First, we
ran the experiment allowing only bids, as opposed to bids and asks. Second, in the
experiment, the group identity of each bidder was public information. The fully
revealing equilibrium is then the appropriate theoretical guide.
Once the market for votes closed, voting took place. All votes were automatically
cast for the preferred option of the post-market owner of the vote, with ties broken
randomly.22 The session then proceeded to the following round, where subjects
were randomly regrouped into new committees. Each experimental session lasted
25 rounds. At the end of each session, subjects were paid their cumulative earnings
20Posted prices had to be between 1 and 100, and no subject was allowed ot post a bid higher
than his current endowment of points. If a subject had reached a 0 balance, he was excluded from
bidding until the balance turned positive, either through selling his vote or through winning the
committee decision.
21The market was open for two minutes in treatment 32C described below. In all treatments,
the market closed early if there was no activity for 30 seconds.
22In one of the 11 sessions run at Caltech (session s5 in Table 1 below), in case of tie each subject
received 50 percent of his value with probability 1. We changed the design to check whether the
uncertainty of the outcome in case of a tie a¤ected the results, but the session is indistinguishable
from the others.
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from all rounds, summing payo¤s from obtaining their preferred committee decisions
and net transfers from the market for votes, multiplied by a pre-announced exchange
rate, plus a xed show-up fee. Each session lasted about 90 minutes, and average
earnings were around $33. A sample of the instructions from one of the sessions is
reproduced in Appendix C.23
Our treatment variables are the relative size of the two groups, m and M , and
whether trade takes place through the group leaders or through the market. The
rst treatment, called 1; 1, captures vote trading through group leaders when the
groups have equal size: each group is represented by a single subject, with opposite
preferences, and each subject enters the vote market with a single vote. The second
treatment, called 3; 2C, captures vote trading through group leaders when the groups
have di¤erent sizes: each group is again represented by a single subject, with opposite
preferences, but the two subjects enter the market endowed with three and two
votes, respectively. We implemented this treatment by generating each subjects
value as a single random draw form 1 to 100, assuming each integer value with equal
probability.24 The third treatment is the market treatment: the two groups, with
opposite preferences, are formed by three and two subjects respectively, and each
individual subject is free to trade, independently of the other members of his group.
Each individual value is an independent random draw, assuming any integer value
between 1 and 100 with equal probability, and each group value then is the sum of
either two or three independent draws. We call this treatment 3; 2. Table 1 reports
the experimental design.
Table 1: Experimental Design
23We used the Multistage Game software package developed jointly between the SSEL and CAS-
SEL labs. This open-source software can be downloaded from http://software.ssel.caltech.edu/
24The alternative would have been to generate the majority leaders value as the sum of three
independent draws, and the minority leaders as the sum of two independent draws. Our design
generates more frequent opportunities for trade, an important consideration in an experiment in
which subjects play no other role and could becomes bored and inattentive, and allows us a direct
comparison between 1; 1 and 3; 2C treatments.
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Session n Treatment Subject pool # Subjects
s1 2 1; 1 NYU 12
s2 2 1; 1 NYU 8
s3 2 1; 1 NYU 10
s4 2 1; 1 NYU 16
s5 2 1; 1 CIT 12
s6 2 1; 1 CIT 10
s7 5 3; 2 NYU 10
s8 5 3; 2 NYU 15
s9 5 3; 2 NYU 20
s10 5 3; 2 NYU 10
s11 5 3; 2 CIT 15
s12 5 3; 2 CIT 15
s13 2 3; 2C NYU 12
s14 2 3; 2C NYU 12
s15 2 3; 2C CIT 10
s16 2 3; 2C CIT 10
Table 2 summarizes the theoretical predictions discussed in the previous section.
Columns 2 and 3 report the expected frequency of minority victories in equilibrium
and under full e¢ ciency; columns 4 and 5 report, respectively, expected ex ante
utility in equilibrium and in the absence of trade, expressed as share of expected ex
ante utility with full e¢ ciency
Table 2: Theoretical predictions. Uniform distribution25
Min victs % E¤. min victs % E(e¤ share) % E(e¤ share, maj) %
1,1 100 75
3,2C 25 50 94 75
3,2 52.5 22.5 84.2 95
4 Experimental Results.
4.1 Prices
For each of the three treatments, the theory has precise predictions about equilibrium
prices. We evaluate our data through two main questions. First, is there evidence
25Recall that treatment 3; 2C is implemented with a single value for each group, drawn for both
groups from a Uniform distribution over support [0; 1]:
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Figure 1: Average percentage di¤erence between realized and equilibrium prices in
each round. Blue columns: average realized price; red columns: last realized price
of convergence towards the equilibrium price over the length of the experimental
sessions? Second, is the theory a good predictor of the prices realized in individual
trades?
Figure 1 plots for each treatment the average percentage di¤erence between real-
ized and equilibrium prices in each round. For each group in each session, we calculate
the equilibrium price given the realized values in each round; we then compare it to
the price at which trade occurred in the experimental data. For each round, the
resulting percentage di¤erence is averaged over all groups and all sessions. If there
are more than one trades, we calculate both the average and the last traded price.
In 1; 1 and 3; 2C treatments, the theory predicts a single trade; multiple trades are
occasionally observed in the data but the results are indistinguishable whether we
use average or last traded price; the gure reports the former. In the market treat-
ment 3; 2, multiple trades are expected and observed, and the results are sensitive to
the price measure.
The gure shows three main regularities. First, in all treatments, there is ten-
dency towards overpricing: the great majority of bars are above zero, indicating that
experimental prices are above equilibrium prices. Second, in 3; 2 sessions there must
be more noise in the pricing of individual trades: the noise washes out when prices
are averaged within the round, but is evident in the large and variable dispersion of
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last traded prices, relative to the equilibrium price. However, and this is the third
remark, there is clear evidence of convergence to equilibrium in 1; 1 and 3; 2 sessions.
Surprisingly, it is the relatively "easy" 3; 2C treatment that most deviates from the
theory. Here the gure shows no evidence of convergence.
A regression of the percentage di¤erence between the realized price and the equi-
librium price on the round number (and a constant) conrms what the gure shows
and is reported in Table 3. The convergence over time in treatments 1; 1 and 3; 2,
but not 3; 2C, as well as the lack of predictability of the 3; 2C prices (notice the
di¤erence in the R2s), and the common overpricing on average, all appear in the
table.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3-2 sessions 3-2 sessions
VARIABLES 1-1 sessions 3-2C sessions av. price last price
Round -0.0205*** 0.0029 -0.0337*** -0.0377***
(0.0025) (0.0118) (0.0049) (0.0060)
Constant 0.466*** 0.180 0.600*** 1.028***
(0.0325) (0.132) (0.0932) (0.114)
Observations 25 25 25 25
R-squared 0.714 0.008 0.620 0.528
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Convergence Regressions
As Figure 1 shows, in treatments 1; 1 and 3; 2 overpricing falls sharply in the last
rounds, suggesting that in earlier rounds it may be due mostly to inexperience. We
have no explanation for the poor predictive power of the equilibrium bid in the 3; 2C
model; possibly subjects found the design confusing (two voters, each with multiple
but unequal votes over a single decision), although an alternative explanation is
risk-aversion.26. Much more striking is the convergence in the 3; 2 data towards the
equilibrium price, because the equilibrium price is not only di¢ cult to calculate but
depends on the realized vectors of values, and thus changes across rounds. The result
suggests that the underlying forces of competitive market exchange, where traders
simply respond to the immediate gains and losses open to them, is indeed driving the
26Risk aversion seems particularly relevant for the 3; 2C data, where overpricing persists even
with experienced traders. In that case, CRRA utility is u = (vi ti)
1 
1  ; and the buyer (minority)
equilibrium bid is b(v) = v=(2  ) for  2 [0; 1) and b(v) = v for   1.
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trades, and the price converges to equilibrium without the conscious calculation of
what the equilibrium price should be. Even in its application to a market for votes,
the experimental data support the fundamental intuition at the heart of competitive
market theory. Casella, et al. report similar convergence towards equilibrium price
when the size of the two groups of voters is not publicly known.
Convergence is evaluated for the average realized price. But are disaggregated
prices consistent with the theory?
Figure 2 presents scatter plots of observed traded prices for each transaction, on
the vertical axis, plotted against the equilibrium price for that group and round, on
the horizontal axis. Each panel in the gure corresponds to a di¤erent treatment,
and in each, grey dots refer to early rounds (1-10) and black dots to late rounds
(11-25). The panels also show two linear regression lines (grey for early rounds and
black for late rounds) and the 45 degree line.
Figure 2: Traded prices versus equilibrium prices, per group and round, and linear
regression lines. Rounds 1-10: grey; rounds 11-25: black.
The dispersion in realized prices is evident in the gure, but so is the positive
correlation between realized prices and equilibrium prices, as well as the convergence
towards equilibrium prices in the later rounds in 1; 1 and 3; 2 sessions. In both of these
treatments, the regression line based on early data is shifted upward, relative to the
regression line with late data, and the grey dots are both more dispersed and biased
upward, relative to the black dots. Neither of these two observations applies to 3; 2C
sessions, where the two regression lines and the grey and black dots are e¤ectively
interchangeable. The gure makes visible another factor that may contribute to
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the observed overpricing: the upper bounds on equilibrium prices are a fraction of
possible realized valuations. While valuations vary between 1 and 100, maximal
equilibrium prices are 50, for 1; 1 and 3; 2C, and 33 for 3; 2. If there is a di¤use
random error in realized prices, with support over the full range of valuations, the
result is systematic overpricing. And if there is more randomness in earlier rounds,
the result is a correlation between overpricing and inexperience.27
Table 4 tests whether the regression lines are signicantly di¤erent from the 45
degree line. The standard errors are clustered at the session level.
1-1 sessions 3-2C sessions 3-2 sessions
Rounds: All 11-25 All 11-25 All 11-25
Eq. price 0.840*** 0.825*** 0.832*** 0.791*** 0.848** 0.865***
(0.132) (0.156) (0.086) (0.111) (0.263) (0.144)
Constant 8.226 6.182 9.442 12.04 13.06** 8.622**
(4.641) (4.681) (4.724) (5.174) (5.043) (3.230)
Obs. 687 409 262 135 337 208
R2 0.185 0.265 0.191 0.188 0.131 0.187
p-val 0.277 0.315 0.146 0.157 0.589 0.390
(coef=1)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Price Regressions
Whether over the full data set or the later rounds only, the slope is not signi-
cantly di¤erent from 1 at any conventional signicance level, in all three treatments;
in treatments 1; 1 and 3; 2C we cannot reject a zero constant; we can, at the 5 percent
level, in 3; 2 treatments. The large unexplained noise in realized prices is reected in
the low R2s, which predictably improve in the later rounds in treatments 1; 1 and
3; 2, but not 3; 2C.
4.2 Trade and votes allocations
If the theory has some predictive power in explaining observed experimental prices,
can it also explain the transactions observed in the experiment? The predictions
di¤er across treatments, and we analyze them separately. In 1; 1 sessions, the theory
27In 1; 1 sessions, the equilibrium price is p = (100+ 2vs)=6, and thus has a minimum at 100=6.
The gure also shows that, in later rounds especially, realized prices appear to lie above a linear
function of the equilibrium price, with slope higher than 1 and negative intercept. The reason is
that sellers only sell if p  vs=2, since the default is a tie. With p = (100+2vs)=6, p  3=2p  25.
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states that all opportunities for trade should be exploited (and there is always an
opportunity for trade), and that trade should always be e¢ cient: the higher value
voter should buy out the lower value voter. Figure 3 reports realized and unrealized
gains from trade. In the rst panel, the vertical axis is the buyers value and the
horizontal axis the sellers value, for each concluded trade: points above the diagonal
are e¢ cient trades, and points below the diagonal are ine¢ cient trades. In the second
panel, the vertical axis is the higher value and the horizontal axis the lower value for
the two experimental subjects in all instances in which no trade took place; thus all
points lie above the diagonal by construction, and each point represents unrealized
gains from trade. As in Figure 2, grey dots refer to early rounds (1-10) and black
dots to rounds 11-25.
Figure 3: Realized and unrealized gains from trade; individual transactions; 1; 1
sessions. Equilibrium predicts trade above the diagonal. Grey dots correspond to
rounds 1-10; black dots to rounds 11-25.
The frequency of e¢ cient tradethe fraction of all points that lie above the diag-
onal in the rst panelwas 61 percent in early rounds and 66 percent in late rounds,
a di¤erence too small to be statistically signicant.28 Later rounds, however, had
smaller mistaken trades: of all dots in the rst panel, a greater share of the grey
dots are below the diagonal, relative to black dots. Precisely, conditional on trade,
76 percent of transactions were e¢ cient in early rounds, versus 84 percent in later
rounds, percentages that according to a Pearson 2 test are signicantly di¤erent
28In probit or logit regressions of the frequency of e¢ cient trade per round on a constant and the
round number, the round number coe¢ cient is not statistically signicant. Similarly, a Pearson 2
test cannot reject the hypothesis of no di¤erence in the realized frequency of e¢ cient trade between
rounds 1-10 and rounds 11-25.
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Figure 4: Realized and unrealized gains from trade; individual transactions; 3; 2C
sessions. Equilibrium predicts trade above the steep line. Grey dots correspond to
rounds 1-10; black dots to rounds 11-25.
at the 5 percent level. In later rounds, mistakes are also more predictable: ine¢ -
cient trades were more likely at low votersvalue, in the bottom left corner of the
rst panel, or when the two values were similar, along the diagonal. On the whole,
then, transactions in 1; 1 sessions were less e¢ cient than the theory predicts, both
because of lower trade and of mistakes in the direction of trade. There is some evi-
dence that subjects learned to avoid mistaken trades, but not to exploit more trading
opportunities.
Figure 4 reports the corresponding data in 3; 2C treatments. The rst panel
reports realized gains (and losses) from trade: the vertical axis is the minority value
and the horizontal axis the majority value in each instance in which the minority
won. The second panel plots the same values in those instances in which a minority
victory would have been e¢ cient but did not take place.29 Again by construction, all
points above the diagonal represent e¢ cient trades. The steeper line is the theoretical
boundary for trade: our auction model predicts that trade will occur for points above
the line, but not below.
The theory predicts that trade, when it occurs, should be e¢ cient, and indeed
the fraction of points below the diagonal in the rst panel is very small, whether in
early or late rounds.30 It also predicts that a large fraction of trading opportunities
29The gures do not report values for which the absence of trade was e¢ cient and was observed.
30The numbers are 4 of 68 total trades in early rounds (5.9 percent), and 4 of 91 in rounds 11-25
(4.4. percent); the di¤erence is statistically insignicant.
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should remain unexploited: with two independent draws from the same Uniform
distribution, the frequency of trade should be 25 percent, or 50 percent if we condition
on the buyers value being higher than the sellers. In the gure, of all points above
the diagonal, the fraction in the rst panel is 57 percent in late rounds and 59
percent in rounds 1-10, values that are not statistically di¤erent either from one
another or from 50 percent.31 In line with the evidence on prices, we see no clear
sign of learning, but our experimental subjects did indeed conclude fewer trades in
the 3; 2C treatment, relative to the 1; 1 treatment. More precisely, the disparity
between the two treatments should be concentrated on realized pairs of valuations
for which the theory predicts no trade in 3; 2C treatmentsrealizations such that the
buyers (the minoritys) value is higher than the sellers (the majoritys) but less than
twice as high. The gures show quite clearly that in both treatments a large fraction
of missed trading opportunities corresponded to realized draws close to the diagonal,
as intuition suggests. But is the concentration signicantly higher in 3; 2C sessions?
In Table 5 we regress the fraction of e¢ cient trades realized in the two treatments
on a constant, the round number, and three indicator variables. The rst indicator
captures whether data were generated in 1; 1 or 3; 2C sessions; the second whether
the valuation draws were in the critical area vb 2 [vs; 2vs]; the third indicator is the
interaction term selecting instances where the valuation draws were in the critical
area in 1; 1 sessions. We report both logit and probit estimations.
As expected, when the valuations are in the critical area, the frequency of realized
trades is smaller; both estimations however show that the e¤ect is signicantly larger
in 3; 2C sessions, in line with theoretical predictions. In fact, again as predicted, all
the di¤erence between 1; 1 and 3; 2C sessions is concentrated in this area: over the
remaining range of value realizations, the coe¢ cient of the indicator variable for 1; 1
sessions is not signicantly di¤erent from zero. The constant, capturing the frequency
of trade common to both treatments when the buyers value is more than twice the
sellers, is predictably positive and large. The estimates show no signicant evidence
of learning.32
In the 3; 2 treatment, the market design induces multiple trades within each
31The relevant Pearson 2 values are 0.08 for early versus late rounds, 1.45 for the late rounds
versus 50 percent, and 1.94 for early rounds versus 50 percent. None of these values is signicant
at the 5 percent signicance level.
32An unexpected nding in 3; 2C sessions is the presence of redundant trades: trades that do not
change ownership of the decision power. Redundant trades are pure transfers with no allocative or
e¢ ciency e¤ect; they are not plotted in Figure 4 and do not change any of our substantive results.
They are however a sign of subjectsconfusion and conrm the lack of ease with which subjects
managed their multiple votes in the 3; 2C treatment.
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(1) (2)
VARIABLES probit logit
1; 1-sessions -0.0474 -0.0812
(0.136) (0.231)
vb 2 [vs; 2vs] -1.012*** -1.643***
(0.164) (0.273)
vb 2 [vs; 2vs] interacted with 1; 1-sessions 0.442** 0.713**
(0.186) (0.310)
Experience (Round) 0.00670 0.0108
(0.00539) (0.00887)
Constant 0.627*** 1.025***
(0.136) (0.230)
Observations 1,124 1,124
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Probability of Realizing an E¢ cient Trade
group. The validity of the theory should be tested on the basis of the nal allocation
of votes, when the market closes. The equilibrium price and the probabilities with
which individuals with di¤erent valuations randomize between demanding one or
two votes, or o¤ering their vote for sale, depend on the realized vector of valuations.
Figure 5 distinguishes the ve possible scenarios. Ordering values as v5  v4  ::: 
v1, the four panels correspond to (from left to right, starting on the top row): (1)
v5 = vm, v4 = vM ; (2) v5 = vM , v4 = vm; (3) v5 = vM , v4 = v(2)M , v3 = vm; (4)
v5 = vm, v4 = v(2)m; (5) v5 = vM , v4 = v(2)M , v3 = vM , the scenario where we expect
the no-trade equilibrium to be focal. The red columns are the expected theoretical
allocations of votes when the market closes, given the experimental valuation draws;
the black columns report the number of votes in the data in rounds 11-25, and the
grey columns in rounds 1-10.
The red columns reect the equilibrium strategies described earlier: in all scenar-
ios with trade, the largest purchases of votes should come from vM and vm, regardless
of the exact position that those two voters occupy in the ranking of valuations. The
prediction is supported by the data: in all four of the top panels, the highest black
columns correspond to vM and vm. The result is remarkable because neither others
realized valuations nor ones own position in the ranking of valuations were known
to the subjects, and the experimental design was such that valuations changed every
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Figure 5: Average votes allocations by value ranking. Experimental results (grey:
rounds 1-10; black: rounds 11-25) versus equilibrium (red columns).
round. And yet apparently, as theory predicts, the voters relative rankings were
revealed through trading. In the data, the voter whose valuation was closest to vM
and vm tended to demand more votes than predicted: the black column correspond-
ing to v3 in the top two panels and to v4 in the second two is consistently higher
than the red column. In all four cases, however, the number of votes remains below
the number acquired by vM and vm, even when, as in the second two panels, the
value of the voter in question was intermediate between vM and vm. There is some
weak appearance of learning: in three of the four cases, the black columns are closer
to equilibrium than the grey columns. It is noticeable too that the concentration
of votes in the hands of vM and vm is always observed in the data, except when
vm < vM and the no-trade equilibrium seems particularly plausible. Although the
data show that some trade did take place, the dispersion in votes holdings across
members of the group is much less pronounced than in all other scenarios, and this
is true both in early and late rounds.
Summarizing then, the data show convergence towards equilibrium prices in 1; 1
and 3; 2 treatments, but not in 3; 2C treatments. We nd more trade in 1; 1 than
in 3; 2C treatments, as expected, and again as expected, the di¤erence arises mostly
from lack of trade when the tradersvalues are close to one another. However the
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data also show that the higher propensity to trade in 1; 1 treatments is accompanied
by a higher propensity for ine¢ cient trades. Finally, the votes allocations in the 3; 2
market appear in line with theory: votes are bought by the two top value members
in each group, regardless of their ranking over the full prole of valuations, unless all
majority voters have higher values than any minority voter. We nd this last result
particularly striking because relative votersvalues, within each group and over the
full committee, were not revealed in the experiment and in general changed with
each round.
If the theory does reasonably well in explaining the trade data, can it also predict
voting outcomes and realized payo¤s?
4.3 Outcomes
Because price data show evidence of learning (in 1; 1 and 3; 2 sessions), later rounds
may be more representative of subjectsintended behavior, and the results we report
below are based on rounds 11 to 25. But because allocations data show little if any
learning, the results are in fact qualitatively identical over the full data set.
How much surplus were the experimental subjects able to appropriate, in the
di¤erent treatments? Figure 6 shows the aggregate payo¤ in each experimental
session, on the vertical axis, versus the corresponding payo¤ if all subjects had played
the equilibrium strategies, on the horizontal axis. Both payo¤s are expressed as
share of the rst-e¢ cient payo¤ (the maximal aggregate payo¤) and all numbers are
calculated on the basis of the realized experimental valuation draws. The symbols
distinguish the di¤erent treatments: circles are 1; 1 sessions; squares are sessions with
groups of unequal size, with solid squares corresponding to 3; 2C sessions and empty
squares to 3; 2 sessions. The diagonal line is the 45 degree line; thus points above the
line indicate experimental payo¤s in excess of the theoretical prediction, and points
below payo¤s that fall short of equilibrium payo¤s.
Experimental payo¤s are lower than equilibrium predictions in 1; 1 sessionsit
could hardly be otherwise, since the theory predicts full e¢ ciency, but the result
also reects the unexpected frequency of ine¢ cient trades. They are comparable to
equilibrium payo¤s in 3; 2C sessions, and higher in the 3; 2market sessions. The more
noticeable feature of the gure is the disparity between the clear e¢ ciency rankings
of the theory and the more uniform level of the experimental payo¤s. While the
di¤erent treatments are distinctly organized along the horizontal axis, experimental
payo¤s as share of e¢ ciency, on the vertical axis, are similar across treatments.
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Figure 6: Experimental payo¤ per session versus equilibrium (as share of e¢ ciency).
Rounds 11-25. Solid white dots correspond to 1; 1 sessions; solid squares to 3; 2C
sessions, and empty squares to 3; 2.
The similarity hides, however, systematically di¤erent mistakes. Consider in
particular treatments 3; 2C and 3; 2. Recall that the theory predicts too little trade
and thus too few minority victories in treatment 3; 2C, and too much trade, and
too many minority victories, in treatment 3; 2. Figure 7 disaggregates the source
of e¢ ciency losses for these treatments. The diagonal lines in the gure are iso-
e¢ ciency loss lines. The origin, at 0,0, denotes full e¢ ciency, or the maximum
possible aggregate payo¤; moving up and to the right, the e¢ ciency losses increase,
with the three iso-loss lines corresponding to losses of 2, 6 and 10 percent respectively.
The horizontal axis measures losses from missed trading opportunities: instances
where the aggregate experimental values of the minority group were higher than
the majoritys and yet the majority won. The vertical axis measures losses from
ine¢ cient trades: instances where the aggregate experimental values of the minority
group were lower than the majoritys and yet the minority won. The symbols are as
in Figure 6: solid squares are 3; 2C treatments, and empty squares 3; 2.
In 3; 2C sessions, the source of losses is almost exclusively missed trading op-
portunities, or ine¢ cient majority victories. Two of the sessions sit exactly on the
horizontal axis: there is not a single instance where the minority wins with lower
aggregate values. Nevertheless, those two sessions show an average loss of 5 percent
of e¢ ciency because of unrealized gains from trade. In 3; 2 treatments, the result
is the opposite: e¢ ciency losses come primarily from too much trade and ine¢ cient
minority victories. Again, in two of the sessions there is not a single instance when
the majority wins with lower aggregate values. But substantial losses are realized
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Figure 7: Realized losses versus unrealized gains, both as share of full e¢ ciency.
Rounds 11-25. The diagonal lines are iso-e¢ ciency loss lines. Solid squares are 3; 2C
sessions; empty squares 3; 2.
because the minority wins too often.
Figure 8 tests directly how the fraction of minority victories in 3; 2C and 3; 2 data
compares to equilibrium predictions and to the e¢ cient fraction of victories. The
rst panel plots the realized frequency of minority victories in each experimental
session, on the vertical axis, and the frequency predicted by the theoretical models,
given the realized experimental draws, on the horizontal axis. In 3; 2C sessions,
the minority won slightly more than the theory predicts.33 In 3; 2 sessions, on the
other hand, the minority systematically won less frequently than theory predicts.
Nevertheless, in all 3; 2 sessions, realized minority victories were more frequent than
in any 3; 2C session.34 The second panel compares the fraction of minority victories
in each experimental session to the e¢ cient fraction, again calculated for each session
according to the realized experimental draws. Again, the predictive power of the
theory is strongly supported. Every point representing a 3; 2 session is above the
45 degree line, and every point representing a 3; 2C session is below: as expected,
the minority wins too much in 3; 2 sessions, and too little in 3; 2C sessions. (In the
33A possible conjecture is that the continuous auction format of the experimental design allowed
more communication than the sealed bid auction of the theoretical model. In other experiments,
direct communication has been shown to increase trade and in fact induce more trade than predicted
by Myerson and Satterthwaites optimal contract (Valley et al., 2002).
34The two treatments are not immediately comparable because in 3; 2C sessions each leaders
value in the experiment was a single draw, as opposed to multiple draws in 3; 2 sessions. Had
leaders values in 3; 2C sessions resulted from summing multiple draws, on average the ratio of
minority to majority value would have been lower, leading to fewer theoretical and most likely
experimental minority victories. The di¤erent design thus makes our conclusions stronger. It does
not inuence the comparison of the data to the theory.
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second panel, the solid square located most to the right hides a second solid square
with almost identical values).
Figure 8: Realized frequency of minority victories, versus equilibrium (panel 1) and
e¢ ent frequency (panel 2). Rounds 11-25. Solid squares are 3; 2C sessions; empty
squares 3; 2.
The conclusion is very robust and remains true at the level of the individual
groups, even with the inevitable added noise. In Figure 9, each dot corresponds to
the fraction of minority victories for each group label, in the two treatments. As
in Figure 8, the fraction realized in the experiment is compared to the theoretical
prediction, in the rst panel, and to the e¢ cient prediction, in the second panel.
Both equilibrium and e¢ cient minority victories are calculated on the basis of the
realized experimental values draws for each group. In the rst panel, solid squares
(3; 2C) remain mostly above the 45 degree line and empty squares (3; 2) below, with
some tendency to align themselves along the 45 degree line; in the second panel, as
expected all empty squares are above (or on) the 45 degree line, and all solid squares
but one are below.
We want to test whether the frequencies of minority victories observed in the
experiment are signicantly di¤erent across the two treatments. We can use the
e¢ cient frequency of minority victories as a means of normalizing the value draws,
and test whether, across groups, the ratios of realized to e¢ cient minority victories
observed in the two treatments could be drawn from the same sample. The hypothesis
is strongly rejected by a two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: the D statistic is 0.96,
with p-value 0.000.
30
Figure 9: Realized frequency of minority victories by group versus equilibrium (panel
1) and e¢ cient frequency (panel 2). Rounds 11-25. Solid squares are 3; 2C sessions,
empty squares 3; 2:
The theory has sharp predictions on the e¢ ciency of vote trading relative to
majority voting with no trade in the di¤erent treatments. Figure 10 plots aggregate
experimental payo¤s per session, on the vertical axis, versus aggregate session payo¤s
in the absence of trade, on the horizontal axis. Both measures are expressed as share
of maximal possible payo¤s.
The results strongly support the theory. As expected, payo¤s were consistently
higher than in the absence of trade in the two treatments with leaderstrading, and
consistently lower in the treatment with market trading. Here too the theoretical
prediction is conrmed in every single experimental session.35
5 Conclusions
The objective of this paper is a better understanding of vote trading in committees
and legislature that operate under simple majority rule.
On the theoretical side, we show that standard economic models of bargaining
and exchange can be appropriately modied or reinterpreted to provide tractable
35If the design of the 32C treatment had included multiple value draws for each side, the payo¤s
with majority voting in the absence of trade would have been higher. The scarcity of mistaken
minority victories reported in Figure 7 suggests that the experimental payo¤s would also have been
higher. The theoretical prediction about the superiority of payo¤s with vote trading, and thus in
the experiment, would not have changed.
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Figure 10: Realized payo¤ per session versus no-trade payo¤ (as share of e¢ ciency).
Rounds 11-25. Solid dots are 1; 1 sessions; solid squares 3; 2C sessions, and empty
squares 3; 2.
equilibrium models of vote trading. If vote trading is centralized, in the sense that
there is a single representative of the interests of each side of an issue - for example,
a party leader - then results from the mechanism design approach to bargaining
theory translate directly to voting environments. Two di¤erent results emerge in
this regard, depending on the relative sizes of the majority and minority parties. If
the size of the two parties is exactly equal, then vote trading can theoretically lead to
a rst best outcome. This follows from an application of the main result in Cramton
et al. (1989). If the size of the two parties is not exactly equal, then vote trading
improves over majority rule without trade, but cannot lead to a rst best outcome.
There is too little vote trading: the majority wins too often. This follows from an
application of the main result in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1982).
If vote trading is decentralized, in the sense that all trading takes place between
individual party members rather than being coordinated by party leaders, then the
standard general equilibrium model of competitive markets can be adapted to these
voting environments. For this purpose, we extend the notion of ex ante competitive
equilibrium developed by Casella et al. (2011) to an environment where the size of
the two opposing groups is known. For the parameterization used in the experiment,
we prove that an ex ante equilibrium exists and exhibits a signicant volume of
trade. In fact, because the competition for votes between the two groups depends
on the relative intensities of preferences of the highest intensity majority voter and
highest intensity minority voter, regardless of the size of the two groups, there is too
much trade. Relative to utilitarian welfare or ex ante e¢ ciency, the minority wins
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too often, and the theory predicts e¢ ciency losses relative to the no-trade voting
outcome.
We conduct laboratory experiments to explore the extent to which the actual
outcomes in committees correspond to the equilibrium outcomes of the theoretical
models of exchange. In line with the theoretical predictions, we observe e¢ ciency
gains to vote trading only in the case where it is centralized through party leaders.
However, the e¢ ciency gains with equal sized committees fall short of the rst best.
We observe e¢ ciency losses in the experimental committees that engage in decen-
tralized trade. Again in line with theory, in every single experimental session we
observe too few minority victories, relative to rst best e¢ ciency, if trading occurs
through party leaders, and too many if it occurs through the market. The transac-
tion prices in our vote markets always start out above the equilibrium prices. With
experience, prices converge to the theoretical equilibrium prices when there is de-
centralized trade and when there is centralized trading between equal sized parties.
In the markets with centralized trading between unequal sized parties, prices persist
above the theoretical equilibrium.
Our theoretical results can be extended in a number of directions. First, the main
conclusions of the ex ante equilibrium in the competitive modelthe competition for
dictatorship between the highest value voters in the two groups, the high ratio of
intra-group trade, the excessive frequency of minority victoriesneed to be veried
for arbitrary committee sizes and arbitrary partitions in majority and minority vot-
ers. Preliminary results suggest that the generalization is likely to hold. Second, it
is clearly important to allow committees to consider more than one issue, and thus
introduce the possibility of log-rolling, or vote trading across issues. This variety
of vote trading is believed to be common practice in real committees, and could be
accomplished with or without the use of a numeraire commodity. Third, it would
be interesting to study more general specications of preferences, in particular the
spatial representation of preferences that has become the standard model for theo-
retical and empirical work in political science. Finally, our model does not address
the complex strategic issues related to agenda setting and proposal power. We have
taken as exogenous the proposal to be voted upon. In practice, votes are taken only
after a proposal has been made, and proposal-making itself would need to consider
the possibility of vote trading that can take place between the proposal stage and
the voting stage. One might conjecture that vote trading could dilute the proposal
power of the agenda setter.
If our theoretical results are robust to these generalizations, they suggest inter-
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esting lines of thought for empirical work. If party discipline translates into more
control by party leaders and more centralized trading, according to our analysis
stronger party discipline will also imply fewer vote trades and fewer minority victo-
ries. In principle at least this could be tested.
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Appendix A
Example. Imagine a full information scenario where vi = 1 for all i 2 M , vi = 2
for all i 2 m, and n = 5. The rationing rule is R1. Then, there exists an ex
ante competitive equilibrium such that one minority voter demands two votes, one
majority voter randomizes between demanding two votes (with probability 2=3) and
selling his vote, and all other voters o¤er to sell. The equilibrium price is p = 1=3.
For consistency with notation used later in the analysis, call vm the minority voter
whose candidate equilibrium strategy is to demand two votes, and vM the majority
voter whose candidate strategy is to randomize between demanding two votes and
selling (vi2M and vi2M will then be the members of each group whose candidate
strategy is to sell). First, note that the strategies described satisfy expected market
balance:
P
i = 2 + (2=3)(2)   3   (1=3)(1) = 0. Second, consider each voter
in turn and verify that at p = 1=3, no-one has an incentive to deviate. Consider
for example vM . Given othersdemands, demanding four or more votes guarantees
being rationed and is equivalent to staying out of the market, an action dominated by
selling. Demanding three votes has equal probability of being rationed as demanding
two votes, but higher expenditure and equal probability of victory if not rationed; it
is dominated by demanding two votes. A demand of one vote is never rationed, but
the voter always loses and pays p; it is dominated by selling. Expected utility from
selling equals p=2; expected utility from demanding two votes equals (1=2)(vM  2p).
At p = 1=3 and vM = 1, p=2 = (1=2)(vM   2p) = 1=6. Voter vM is indeed indi¤erent
between o¤ering to sell and demanding two votes, and any other action is dominated.
The same reasoning establishes that demanding three or more votes or staying out of
the market are both dominated by selling for all voters. As for the other actions, it
is trivial to compute the corresponding expected utilities and verify the claim above.
Call EUviA the expected utility of voter with value vi from action A 2 fS;D1; D2g,
with obvious notation. Given vi = 1 for all i 2 M , vi = 2 for all i 2 m, we nd:
EUvmD2 = 8=9; EUvmD1 =  1=3 if m = 1 and 1=6 if m = 2; EUvmS = 1=9;
EUvi2MD2 = 19=54; EUvi2MD1 = 14=54; EUvi2MS = 29=54; and nally, if m = 2,
EUvi2mD2 = 52=54; EUvi2MD1 = 74=54; EUvi2MS = 83=54. The claim in the
example is established.
Proposition 1. Suppose M = 3 and m = 2. Then for all realizations of
fv1; ::; v5g such that vm  vM , a fully revealing ex ante equilibrium exists. The
equilibrium price is always such that min(vm; vM) is indi¤erent between demanding
two votes and selling his vote.
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We prove the Proposition by constructing an equilibrium. As in the text, call g0
the group such that vg0  vg, and call v(2)g0 the second highest value in group g0.
The equilibrium is characterized in the following three lemmas.
Lemma 1 If vg  (2=7)v(2)g0, then there exists a fully revealing ex ante equilibrium
such that voters vg0 and vg randomize between demanding two votes and selling their
vote (with probabilities vg0 ,and vg) and all other voters o¤er to sell their vote. The
randomization probabilities and the equilibrium price depend on the value realizations.
In particular: (a) If vm 2 [(2=7)v(2)M ; (3=5)vM ], then vM = 0, vm = 1=3, and
p = vm=3; (b) If vm 2 (3=5vM , 5=6vM), then vM , vm, and p are solutions to the
system:
1 = 3(vM + vm) (S1)
p = vM

1  vm
3 + vm

p = vm

1 + vM
3 + vM

(iv) If vM 2 [(2=7)v(2)m; (6=5)vm], then vM = 1=3, vm = 0, and p = vM=3.
Lemma 2 If vg 2 [(1=14)v(2)g0 ; (2=7)v(2)g0 ], then there exists a fully revealing ex ante
equilibrium such that voter vg0 demands two votes, v(2)g0 randomizes between demand-
ing one vote and o¤ering his vote for sale (with probability v(2)g0 ),vg randomizes be-
tween demanding two votes and selling his vote (with probability vg), and all other
voters o¤er to sell their vote. The randomization probabilities and the equilibrium
price are solutions to the system:
3 = 2v(2)g0 + 3vg (S2)
p = v(2)g0

1  vg
6 + 3vg

p = vg
 
2 + v(2)g0
10  v(2)g0
!
Lemma 3 If vg  (1=14)v(2)g0, then for all realizations of fv1; ::; v5g such that
vm  vM there exists a fully revealing ex ante equilibrium such that voters vg0 and
v(2)g0 demand one vote, vg randomizes between demanding two votes and selling his
vote (with probability vg = 2=3) and all other voters o¤er to sell their vote. The
equilibrium price is vg=4.
We reproduce below the proof of Lemma 1. The proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3
are similar and the details are available as an online supplementary material. (See
Appendix B of this manuscript version).
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Proof of Lemma 1. If voters preferred alternative is known, establishing
that the candidate strategies and price are an equilibrium follows immediately from
comparing the expected utilities of di¤erent actions, given othersstrategies. Call
EUvigA the expected utility of voter with value vi belonging to group g from action
A 2 fS; 0; D1; D2g, with obvious notation. In this case, allowing for both vM > 0
and vm > 0:
EUvMD2 = (vM   2p)(1 + vm)=2
EUvMD1 = vmvM   p
EUvM0 = vmvM
EUvMS = vmvM + (1  vm)p=2
EUvmD2 = (vm   2p)(1 + vM )=2
EUvmD1 = vM3vm=4  p
EUvm0 = 0
EUvmS = (1  vM )p=2
EUviMD2 = vM [vm(viM   2p) + (1  vm)(viM=2  p)] + (S3)
+(1  vM )[vm(viM   p) + 2(1  vm)(viM   p)=3]
EUviMD1 = vM [vm(viM   p)  (1  vm)p] +
+(1  vM )[vm(viM   p) + (1  vm)(2viM   p)=3]
EUviM0 = vm [vMviM + (1  vM )viM ] + (1  vm)(1  vM )viM=2
EUviMS = vM [vmviM + (1  vm)p=2] +
+(1  vM )[vm(viM + p=2) + (1  vm)(viM=2 + 2p=3)]
EUvimD2 = vM [vm(vi   2p) + (1  vm)(vim   p)] +
+(1  vM )[vm(vim=2  p) + 2(1  vm)(vim   p)=3]
EUvimD1 = vM [vm(3vim=4  p) + (1  vm)(vim   p)] +
+(1  vM )[vm( p) + (1  vm)(2vim   p)=3]
EUvim0 = (1  vm)[vMvim + (1  vM )vim=2]
EUvimS = (1  vm)vM (vim + p=2) + (1  vM )[vmp=2 + (1  vm)(vim=2 + 2p=3)]
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where viM  vM , and vim  vm. Expected market balance requires
P
i = 0, where
i is individual is expected demand, or 2(1  vM )+ 2(1  vm) = 3+vM +vm, or
vM + vm = 1=3. Given the equations in (S2), it follows immediately that vM and
vm are both indi¤erent between D2 and S if:
p = vM

1  vm
3 + vm

p = vm

1 + vM
3 + vM

It is not di¢ cult to verify that expected market balance and the two indi¤erence
conditions can be satised simultaneously at vM 2 (0; 1], vm 2 (0; 1] only if vm 2
(3=5vM , 5=6vM). If vm  (5=6)vM , the price that makes vM indi¤erent between
D2 and S is too low to induce vm to sell with positive probability: the equilibrium
must then have vm = 0, vM = 1=3, and p = vM=3. If vM  (5=3)vm, the price
that makes vm indi¤erent between D2 and S is too low to induce vM to sell with
positive probability: the equilibrium must have vM = 0, vm = 1=3, and p = vm=3.
Establishing that the stated strategies are best responses to each other is trivial,
given p, vm and vM and the equations in (S3). In addition, if vm > vM , the
condition vim (7=2)vM is required to prevent the protable deviation of voter
vim to demanding a positive number of votes; similarly if vM > vm, the condition
viM  (7=2)vm is required to guarantee that selling is a best response for voter
viM . The intuition is straightforward: if vim> (7=2)vM , the price that makes vM
indi¤erent between selling and demanding two votes is too low to induce vim to sell,
as this equilibrium prescribes; and similarly if viM > (7=2)vm.
Finally, we need to show that the equilibrium is fully revealing. First notice that
there can be no equilibrium with trade where both m members o¤er to sell their
vote with probability onebecause no M member would have an incentive to buy.
Hence vM knows that in equilibrium the other voter with positive expected demand
belongs to group m; of the sellers, two must belong to M and one to m. Consider
now the problem from the point of view of vm. Given othersequilibrium strategies,
expected market balance requires vm to demand a positive number of votes. It is not
di¢ cult to verify that at p if the voter mixing between D2 and S with probability
vM belonged to m, vms best response is S. However, S does not satisfy expected
market balance. Hence vm knows that in equilibrium the other voter with positive
expected demand belongs to group M ; again, of the sellers, two must belong to
M and one to m. As for the sellers, market balance requires each of them to sell
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with probability one. Among them, each M member knows that the two voters
with positive expected demand cannot both belong to group m, by the argument
above; not can they both belong to group M , because in equilibrium at least one m
member must demand votes with positive probability. Similarly, the m seller knows
that the other m member cannot also be selling with probability one. Hence, each
seller knows that one but not both of the voters with positive demands must belong
to his own group; the seller cannot know which one, but is indi¤erent: the unique
best response is to sell. Thus the equilibrium is indeed fully revealing.
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Appendix B (Online supplementary material. Not
intended for printed publication.)
Lemma 2. If vg 2 [(1=14)v(2)g0 ; (2=7)v(2)g0 ], then there exists a fully revealing ex
ante equilibrium such that voter vg0 demands two votes, v(2)g0 randomizes between
demanding one vote and o¤ering his vote for sale (with probability v(2)g0 ),vg ran-
domizes between demanding two votes and selling his vote (with probability vg),
and all other voters o¤er to sell their vote. The randomization probabilities and the
equilibrium price are solutions to the system:
3 = 2v(2)g0 + 3vg (S2)
p = v(2)g0

1  vg
6 + 3vg

p = vg
 
2 + v(2)g0
10  v(2)g0
!
Proof of Lemma 2.We need to distinguish the two possible cases: g0 = m, and
g0 =M . (1) If g0 = m, each voters preferred alternative is known, and each expects
the others to follow the strategies described in the lemma, the expected utilities of
di¤erent actions are given by:
EUvmD2 = vMv(2)m(vm   2p) + vM (1  v(2)m)(vm   2p) +
+(1  vM )v(2)m(vm=2  p) + 2(1  vM )(1  v(2)m)(vm   p)=3
EUvmD1 = vMv(2)m(3vm=4  p) + vM (1  v(2)m)(vm   p) +
+(1  vM )v(2)m( p) + 2(1  vM )(1  v(2)m)(vm   p)=3
EUvm0 = (1  v(2)m)vMvm + (1  vM )(1  v(2)m)vm=2
EUvmS = (1  v(2)m)vM (3vm=4 + p=4) + (1  vM )v(2)mp=2
+(1  vM )(1  v(2)m)p
EUv(2)mD2 = vM (v(2)m   p) + 2(1  vM )(v(2)m   p)=3
EUv(2)mD1 = vM (v(2)m   p) + 2(1  vM )(v(2)m   p=2)=3
EUv(2)m0 = vMv(2)m + (1  vM )v(2)m=2
EUv(2)mS = vM (v(2)m + p=2) + (1  vM )(v(2)m=2 + 2p=3) (S4)
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EUvMD2 = v(2)m(vM=2  p) + (1  v(2)m)(vM=3  2p=3)
EUvMD1 = v(2)m( p) + (1  v(2)m)( 2p=3)
EUvM0 = 0
EUvMS = v(2)mp=2 + (1  v(2)m)p
EUviMD2 = vMv(2)m(viM=2  p) + vM (1  v(2)m)(viM   2p)=3 +
+(1  vM )2v(2)m(viM   p)=3
EUviMD1 = vMv(2)m( p) + vM (1  v(2)m)( 2p=3) +
+(1  vM )v(2)m(2viM   p)=3 + (1  vM )(1  v(2)m)(viM   p)=2
EUviM0 = (1  vM )v(2)mviM=2
EUviMS = vMv(2)mp=2 + vM (1  v(2)m)p+ (1  vM )v(2)m(viM=2 + 2p=3) +
+(1  vM )(1  v(2)m)(viM=3 + 5p=6)
with viM  vM < v(2)m. Expected market balance requires 2 + (1   v(2)m) + 2(1  
vM ) = 2 + v(2)m + vM , or 3 = 2v(2)m + 3vM , which implies vM 2 [1=3; 1].
Given system (S4), it is cumbersome but not di¢ cult to verify that the strategies
assigned to each voter are best responses to othersstated strategies and to the price
if, conditional on expected market balance, p, v(2)m, and vM satisfy:
p = v(2)m

1  vM
6 + 3vM

p = vM
 
2 + v(2)m
10  v(2)m
!
and vM 2 [(1=14); v(2)m; (2=7)v(2)m].36
To conclude the proof, we thus need to show that when voters preferences are
not known ex ante, the equilibrium is fully revealing. We proceed in steps. Consider
rst vm. The question is whether in equilibrium vm can identify that the other
m member must be the individual randomizing between D1 and S. The possible
alternative scenarios are described in Table A1. The rst row identies the group
of the individual whose perspective we are taking, and the constraint that expected
36The lower bound on acceptable vM values is not necessary: the equilibrium exists for all
vM  (2=7)v(2)m. A corresponding restriction however is required when g0 = M . We impose it in
this case too to maintain the symmetry of the notation in the lemma. As discussed at the end of
the proof, there are ranges of value realizations for which multiple equilibria exist.
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market balance imposes on his strategy.
Table A1
1 2 3
D2 m m m
D2=S m M M
D1=S M M m
S M m M
S M M M
Case 1 cannot be an equilibrium: for any p , vm would gain by deviating from D2 to
D1, violating expected market balance. Case 2 cannot be a fully revealing equilib-
rium either: consider theM member with assigned strategy D1=S; expected market
balance requires the voter assigned strategy D2=S to sell with some probability
  1=3the probability labeled vMbut for any   1=3 in a fully revealing equi-
librium there exists no value v such that theM member with assigned strategyD1=S
could be indi¤erent between D1 and S and prefer D1 to D2. Thus if a fully reveal-
ing equilibrium exists, preferences and strategies must be described by Case 3: the
other m member must be the individual randomizing between D1 and S. Consider
now the problem from the perspective of v(2)m. Again the question is whether he
can identify that the other m member must be the individual demanding two votes.
Expected market balance constrains v(2)m to sell his vote with positive probability,
and to demand votes with positive probability. We indicate this constraint by the
notation D=S, because it could be satised by randomizing over the full set of pos-
sible actions, as long as positive probability is assigned to selling and to demanding.
The possible cases are described in Table A2.
Table A2
1 2 3
D=S m m m
D2=S m M M
D2 M M m
S M m M
S M M M
It is not di¢ cult to verify that under both Case 1 and Case 2, for any vM 
1=3, v(2)ms unique best response is D2. But D2 would violate expected budget
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balance. Hence in equilibrium the only possible case is 3: it must be that the other
m member is demanding two votes. Finally, we need to establish that all majority
members, vM and the two members labeled viM , in equilibrium assign the correct
corresponding strategies to the two minority members. Consider rst individual vM ,
who in equilibrium is assigned strategy D2=S. The relevant cases are in Table A3:
Table A3
1 2 3 4
D=S M M M M
S m m m M
S m M M M
D2 M m M m
D1=S M M m m
Case 1 is ruled out because there can be no fully revealing equilibrium where both
minority members sell with probability one. In Case 2, D2 always dominates D1
for vM . If v(2)m > 1=2 (recall that v(2)m is the selling probability of the individual
with strategy D1=S), then for vM , S strictly dominates not entering the market.
Hence if v(2)m > 1=2, vM must play strategy D2=S. But expected market balance
then constrains vM > 1=3, in which case strategy D1=S cannot be a best response
for an M member because for any value v both D1 and S are dominated by D2.
If v(2)m < 1=2, then for vM , not entering the market dominates S. But then vMs
expected demand must be positive, and with v(2)m < 1=2, expected market balance
is violated.37 Hence Case 2 is excluded. In Case 3, it can be veried easily that
S is vMs best response to the othersstrategies; but for all v(2)m > 0 selling with
probability one violates expected market balance.38 Hence Case 3 can be excluded
too. The relevant scenario must be Case 4. Consider now majority member viM , who
is constrained by expected market balance to sell his vote. The possible scenarios
37If v(2)m = 1=2, D2 is vM best response, which again violates market balance.
38If v(2)m = 0 and vM sells with probability one, expected market balance is satised but
v(2)ms strategy is clearly suboptimal: EUv(2)mD1 =  p, dominated for example by not entering
the market.
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are described in Table A4 below:
Table A4
1 2 3 4 5 6
S M M M M M M
D2 m m M M M m
D2=S m M M m m M
D1=S M M m m M m
S M m m M m M
Taking into account the constraints on the randomization probabilities, the argu-
ments described above exclude Case 1 (because the m voter assigned strategy D2
would have a protable deviation to D1), Case 2 (because the M voter assigned
strategy D1=S would have a protable deviation to D2), and Cases 3 and 4 (because
in both the m voter assigned strategy D1=S would have a protable deviation to
D2). From the perspective of majority member viM , Cases 5 and 6 cannot be dis-
tinguished. But the distinction is irrelevant: viMs unique best response is S in both
scenarios.
(2). If g0 =M , each voters preferred alternative is known, and each voter expects
the others to follow the strategies described in the lemma, the expected utilities of
di¤erent actions are given by:
EUvMD2 = v(2)M [vm(vM   2p) + (1  vm)(vM=2  p)] +
+(1  v(2)M )[vm(vM   2p) + 2(1  vm)(vM   p)=3]
EUvMD1 = v(2)M [vm(vM   p) + (1  vm)( p)] +
+(1  v(2)M )[vm(vM   p) + 2(1  vm)(vM   p)=3]
EUvM0 = vmvM + (1  vm)(1  v(2)M )vM=2
EUvMS = v(2)M [vmvM + (1  vm)p=2] +
+(1  v(2)M )[vm(vM + p=4) + (1  vm)p]
EUv(2)MD2 = vm(v(2)M   p) + (1  vm)(2v(2)M   2p)=3
EUv(2)MD1 = vm(v(2)M   p) + (1  vm)(2v(2)M   p)=3
EUv(2)M0 = vmv(2)M + (1  vm)v(2)M=2
EUv(2)MS = vm(v(2)M + p=2) + (1  vm)(v(2)M=2 + 2p=3)
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EUvmD2 = v(2)M (vvm=2  p) + (1  v(2)M )(vvm=3  2p=3)
EUvmD1 = v(2)M ( p) + (1  v(2)M )( 2p=3) (S5)
EUvm0 = 0
EUvmS = v(2)M (p=2) + (1  v(2)M )p
EUvMD2 = v(2)M [vm(vM   p) + (1  vm)2(vM   p)=3 +
+(1  v(2)M )[vm(vM   2p=3) + (1  vm)vM ]
EUvMD1 = vm [v(2)M (vM   p) + (1  v(2)M )(vM   2p=3)] +
+(1  vm)[v(2)M (2vM   p)=3 + (1  v(2)M )(vM   p=2)]
EUvM0 = vmvM + (1  vm)[(1  v(2)M )vM + v(2)MvM=2]
EUvMS = vm [v(2)M (vM + p=2) + (1  v(2)M )(vM + p)] +
+(1  vm)[v(2)M (vM=2 + 2p=3) + (1  v(2)M )(2vM=3 + 5p=6)]
EUvimD2 = v(2)M [vm(vim=2  p) + 2(1  vm)(vim   p)=3] + (1  v(2)M )vm(vim   2p)=3
EUvimD1 = v(2)M [vm( p) + (1  vm)(2vim   p)=3] +
+(1  v(2)M )[vm( 2p=3) + (1  vm)(vim   p)=2]
EUvim0 = v(2)M (1  vm)vim=2
EUvimS = v(2)M [vmp=2 + (1  vm)(vim=2 + 2p=3)] +
+(1  v(2)M )[vmp+ (1  vm)(vim=3 + 5p=6)]
Exactly as in (1) above, if voterspreferences are known, the strategies and price
in the lemma can be shown to be an equilibrium by verifying that expected market
balance is satised and no protable deviation exists for any voter, given system
(S5).39 The logical arguments followed in (1) can also be used here to show that
the equilibrium is fully revealing. Recall that expected market balance imposes
vm 2 [1=3; 1].Consider rst voter vM , constrained by expected market balance to
39To prevent deviation by vM , there is a necessary constraint on the lower bound of vm: vm 
592=(3(1381 + 51
p
817))v(2)M , or vm  0:0695v(2)M , satised by vm  (1=14)v(2)M . The condition
is required because at low enough vm=v(2)M , vm approaches 1, and v(2)M approaches 0, and thus
vM can protable deviate to demanding a single vote. The protable deviation only exists because
vM is a majority voter.
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strategy D2. From his perspective, the possible cases are depicted in Table A5:
Table A5
1 2 3 4
D2 M M M M
D2=S m m M M
D1=S m M m M
S M m m m
S M M M m
Case 4 is excluded because in equilibrium both minority members cannot be selling
with probability one. Case 1 and Case 3 are identical to Case 4 and Case 3 in Table
A4 above, and can be excluded through the same arguments. Hence the correct
scenario must be Case 2. Consider then voter v(2)M , who in equilibrium must, by
market balance, demand votes with some positive probability. Table A6 reports the
possible cases, from his perspective:
Table A6
1 2 3 4
D=S M M M M
D2=S m m M M
D2 m M m M
S M m m m
S M M M m
Case 4 is excluded because there cannot be an ex ante equilibrium with trade in
which both m members sell with probability one. Cases 1 and 2 can also be excluded
because for all vm 2 [1=3; 1], p must be such that voter v(2)M would have a protable
deviation to D2, violating expected market balance. Hence the correct scenario is
Case 2. From the point of view of voter viM  v(2)M , with equilibrium strategy S,
the possible cases are represented in Table A4 above. As argued there, all scenarios
can be excluded but Case 6 (the true state when g0 = m) and Case 5 (the true state
here). But the inability to distinguish the two scenarios is irrelevant: in both cases,
the unique best response for viM is S. Finally, for each of the two m members, the
strategy of the other can be identied easily. From the point of view of vm, with
equilibrium strategy D2=S, the other m member cannot play either strategy D2
(because vms best response would then be S, violating expected market balance),
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or strategy D1=S (because for any v(2)M > 0, vms best response would then be
D2, again violating expected market balance); hence he must be playing strategy
S. From the point of view of vim  vm, with equilibrium strategy S, the other m
member cannot play strategy S (because none of theM voters would then be buying
with positive probability), or D2 (because theM voter with assigned strategy D1=S
would have a protable deviation to D2), or D1=S (because, again as argued earlier,
the m voter with assigned strategy D1=S would have a protable deviation to D2);
hence he must be playing strategy D2=S.
Lemma 3. If vg  (1=14)v(2)g0, then for all realizations of fv1; ::; v5g such that
vm  vM there exists a fully revealing ex ante equilibrium such that voters vg0 and
v(2)g0 demand one vote, vg randomizes between demanding two votes and selling his
vote (with probability vg = 2=3), and all other voters o¤er to sell their vote. The
equilibrium price is vg=4.
Proof of Lemma 3.Again, we need to distinguish the two cases: g0 = m, and
g0 =M . (1) If g0 = m, each voters preferred alternative is known, and each expects
the others to follow the strategies described in the lemma, the expected utilities of
di¤erent actions are given by:
EUvjmD2 = vM (vjm   2p) + (1  vM )2(vjm   p)=3
EUvjmD1 = vM (vjm   p) + (1  vM )2(vjm   p)=3
EUvjm0 = vMvjm + (1  vM )vjm=2
EUvjmS = vM (3vjm=4 + p=4) + (1  vM )p
EUvMB2 = (vM   2p)=3
EUvMB1 =  2p=3 (S6)
EUvM0 = 0
EUvMS = 2p=3
EUviMB2 = vM (viM=3  2p=3)
EUviMB1 = vM2( p)=3 + (1  vM )(viM=3  p=3)
EUviM0 = 0
EUviMS = vM (2p=3) + (1  vM )(viM=3 + p)
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where vjm = vm; v(2)m, and viM  vM . Expected market balance requires 2 + vM =
2+2(1 vM ), or vM = 2=3, and vM is indi¤erent between demanding two votes and
o¤ering to sell his vote if p = vM=4. It can then be veried immediately that if vM <
v(2)m=4 the strategies in the lemma are an equilibrium; thus they are an equilibrium
if vM < (1=14)v(2)m. We then need to verify that the equilibrium is fully revealing.
Consider rst the perspective of minority voter vjm = vm; v(2)m, constrained by
expected market equilibrium to demand one vote. The possible scenarios are in
Table A7:
Table A7
1 2 3
D1 m m m
D1 M M m
D2=S M m M
S m M M
S M M M
In both Case 1 and Case 2, the voter assigned strategy D2=S could deviate to
0, satisfying expected market balance and increasing his expected utility; thus the
equilibriummust be Case 3. Consider nowmajority voter vM . The two voters o¤ering
their vote for sale cannot both be minority voters. Hence one majority voter must
have strategy S. If the other majority voter had strategyD1, then vMs best response
would be to do nothing; this would satisfy expected market balance but would mean
that the voter assigned strategy D1, a minority member, would be playing a strategy
that cannot be a best responsefor example it would be clearly dominated by doing
nothing. Hence the assigned strategies could not be an equilibrium. Thus, from the
perspective of voter vM , both voters who o¤er their vote for sale must be majority
members, and both voters demanding one vote must be minorities. Finally, consider
majority voter viM , constrained by expected market balance to selling his vote. From
his perspective, the possible cases are as in Table A8:
Table A8
1 2 3 4 5 6
S M M M M M M
D1 m m m m m M
D1 m M M M M M
D2=S M m M m M m
S M M m M m m
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But in Cases 2, 3, 4, and 5, the voter assigned strategy D2=S would have a protable
deviation to 0, compatible with expected market equilibrium; hence those cases are
excluded. Cases 1 and 6 cannot be distinguished, but the distinction is irrelevant:
viMs unique best response is S in both scenarios.
(2). If g0 =M , each voters preferred alternative is known, and each voter expects
the others to follow the strategies described in the lemma, the expected utilities of
di¤erent actions are given by:
EUvjMD2 = vm(vjM   2p) + (1  vm)2(vjM   p)=3
EUvjMD1 = vm(vjM   p) + (1  vm)2(vjM   p)=3
EUvjM0 = vmvjM + (1  vm)vjM=2
EUvjMS = vm(vjM + p=4) + (1  vm)p
EUvmD2 = (vm   2p)=3
EUvmD1 = 2( p)=3
EUvm0 = 0
EUvmS = 2p=3 (S7)
EUvimD2 = vm(vim=3  2p=3)
EUvimD1 = vm( 2p=3) + (1  vm)(vim=3  p=3)
EUvim0 = 0
EUvimS = vm(2p=3) + (1  vm)(vim=3 + p)
EUvMD2 = vm(vM   2p=3) + (1  vm)vM
EUvMD1 = vm(vM   2p=3) + (1  vm)(vM   p=3)
EUvM0 = vM
EUvMS = vm(vM + 2p=3) + (1  vm)(2vM=3 + p)
where vjM = vM ; v(2)M ; vim  vm  v(2)M , and vM  vim. As in (1) above, expected
market balance requires 2+vm = 2+2(1 vm), or vm = 2=3, and vm is indi¤erent
between demanding two votes and o¤ering to sell his vote if p = vm=4. For the
value realizations considered here, when g0 = M , vMs best response is selling as
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long as vM < 7=4vm, a condition guaranteed by vM  vm. It can then be veried
immediately that if vm  v(2)M=4 the strategies in the lemma are an equilibrium;
thus they are an equilibrium if vm  (1=14)v(2)M .
We then need to verify that the equilibrium is fully revealing. Consider rst the
perspective of voter vjM ; assigned strategy D1 by expected market balance. At least
one of the voters selling with probability one must belong to M . But if the other
M member played either strategy D2=S or strategy S, then, since p < vjM=4, voter
vjM would gain from deviating to D2, violating expected market balance. Hence the
other M member must be playing strategy D1; and thus the two m members must
be playing strategies D2=S and S. Consider then voter vm, who, by expected market
balance must be demanding a positive number of votes with positive probability. If
the other m member played strategy D1, at p < vm, vms best response would be
doing nothing, which would satisfy expected market balance. But if a fully revealing
ex ante equilibrium exists it cannot have vm staying out of the market and the other
voters playing the strategies conjectured here: the M voter playing D1 would be
sure to buy a vote and lose the election, a strategy that cannot be a best response
for any positive p. Hence the other m voter must be selling, and voter vm can deduce
the direction of preferences of all other voters. Consider then voter vim  vm, who
must sell to satisfy expected market balance. From his perspective, the otherm voter
cannot be selling. If he played D1, anM voter would have strategy D2=S, but would
then gain by staying out of the market. Hence the other m voter must be playing
strategy D2=S. Finally consider voter vM , assigned strategy S by expected market
balance. The possible scenarios are in Table A.8 above, and as argued earlier, the
only possibilities are Cases 1 and 6. These two cases cannot be distinguished, but
the distinction is irrelevant: vMs unique best response is S in both scenarios. We
have thus shown that the equilibrium is fully revealing.
By proving Lemma 1, 2 and 3, we have shown that a fully revealing ex-ante
equilibrium exists. The proposition is proven. Note that as the proofs of Lemma
2 and Lemma 3 make clear, for vg 2 [0:0695v(2)g0 ; (1=4)v(2)g0 ], both the equilibrium
described in Lemma 2 and the equilibrium described in Lemma 3 exist.
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Appendix C (Online supplementary material. Not
intended for printed publication.)
This appendix contains a sample of the instructions given to subjects. It corresponds
to the 3; 2 market treatment.
INSTRUCTIONS
[SCREEN 0]
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this decision making experiment. During
the experiment we require your complete, undistracted attention, and ask that you
follow instructions carefully. You may not open other applications on your computer,
chat with other students, or engage in other distracting activities, such as using your
phone, reading books, etc.
You will be paid for your participation in cash, at the end of the experiment.
Di¤erent participants may earn di¤erent amounts. What you earn depends partly
on your decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance.
The entire experiment will take place through computer terminals, and all
interaction between you will take place through the computers. It is important that
you not talk or in any way try to communicate with other participants during the
experiments.
We will start with a brief instruction period. During the instruction period,
you will be given a complete description of the experiment and will be shown how
to use the computers. If you have any questions during the instruction period, raise
your hand and your question will be answered out loud so everyone can hear. If
you have any questions after the experiment has begun, raise your hand, and an
experimenter will come and assist you.
The experiment you are participating in is a committee voting experiment, where
you will have an opportunity to buy and sell votes before voting on an outcome.
At the end of the experiment you will be paid the sum of what you have earned,
plus a show-up fee of $10.00. Everyone will be paid in private and you are under no
obligation to tell others how much you earned. Your earnings during the experiment
are denominated in POINTS. Your DOLLAR earnings are determined by multiplying
your earnings in POINTS by a conversion rate. For this experiment the conversion
rate is 0.03, meaning that 100 POINTS equal 3 DOLLARS.
The experiment will have 25 matches. At the beginning of the rst match, you
will be randomly assigned with 4 other persons in the room to form a 5-member
committee, which will vote to decide on outcome X or outcome Y. Of the 5 members
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of your committee, 3 members are in favor of X; the other 2 members are in favor
of Y. Whether you are in favor of X or Y is decided randomly by the computer and
will be displayed on your computer monitor.
You are also randomly assigned an outcome value, which is a payo¤ you get if
your preferred outcome is the committee decision. Your assigned outcome valueis
equally likely to be any integer from 1 to 100 points. Di¤erent members are randomly
assigned di¤erent outcome values. If you are in favor of X, you will earn your value if
X is the committee decision and zero if Y wins. Similarly, you will earn your value if
you are in favor of Y and Y is the committee decision, and zero otherwise. Outcome
X is the committee decision if there are more votes for X than for Y and vice versa.
Each committee member starts the match with one vote. After being told your
outcome value, but before voting, there will be a 3 minute trading period, during
which you and the other members of your committee will have an opportunity to
buy or sell each others votes. We will describe how trading occurs momentarily.
After the trading period ends, we proceed to the voting stage. In this stage you
do not really have any choice. You will simply be asked to click a button to cast all
your votes, if you have any, for your preferred outcome. When all committees have
nished, the rst match is complete and we will go to the next match. You will be
randomly re-matched into new 5-person committees, and will repeat the procedure
described above.
This will continue for a total of 25 matches.
[SCREEN 1]
When we begin a match, you will see a screen like this. Your Subject ID# is
printed at the very top left of your screen, and remains the same through the whole
experiment.
The current match number, your outcome value and your group (outcome pref-
erence) are displayed below your subject ID in the left part of the screen. Notice
that this is an example of a committee member in favor of X with value 80. The
numbers on this slide are for illustration only. Your outcome values will always be
between 1 and 100. Below your value is a table that claries how many votes each
member of the committee currently has, the group each member is in, and assigns
you a temporary committee member number for this match. Your information is
highlighted in green and the other membersinformation is not highlighted. Notice
that you do not see the values of the other members.
The middle panel is the trading window. The right panel is the voting panel,
which is inactive now because we are in the trading stage. Just above the table,
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is your cash holdings. At the beginning of the experiment, you will be loaned an
initial amount of cash of 200 points, which will not be included in your nal earnings.
Trading occurs in the following way. At any time during this trading period, any
member may post a bid for any amount between 1 and 100 points, which indicates
an amount that you are willing to pay to buy the other members vote. This bid will
be posted on the trading board on the computer screens of all committee members.
If some other member has already posted a bid to buy, you may post your own bid,
but your bid must be an improvement, i.e., a higher bid. Whenever a new bid is
entered, it cancels any outstanding bid if there is one. If another member has an
active bid, then you may accept that bid, in which case a trade has occurred. You
have traded your vote to the other member, and in exchange the other member pays
you his bid. Similarly, if you have an active bid and the other member accepts it,
you receive their vote, but you must pay the other member the amount of your bid.
Trade is entirely voluntary. If a trade occurs, then the trading board is open once
again for new bids. Because there is no longer an active bid, any new bid between
1 and 100 is acceptable. Once a new bid has been made, additional bids must be
improvements, until another trade occurs, if it does. Bids may not be canceled. The
trading period ends after 2 minutes. There are two additional trading rules. First,
if your cash holdings ever become 0 or negative, you may not place any bids until it
becomes positive again. Second, you may not sell votes if you do not have any.
As the experiment proceeds, your cash holdings will be updated to reect any
earnings you make. It increases when you sell your vote or when you earn your
outcome value as a result of the voting. It decreases when you buy a vote. At the
top right, above the voting window is a countdown timer that tells you how much
time is left in the trading period. The timer will turn red when there are 10 seconds
left in the trading period. There is a history panel in the lower part of the screen
which will keep track of the history of the current and all past matches.
At the bottom of the middle trading panel there is an area where you can type in
your bid. When you do so, it will look like this: [SCREEN 2, 54 entered]. Of course
the bid you see here is just for illustration. Your bids must always be between 1 and
100. After you type a bid in, you click the bidbutton just to the right, and your
bid will appear in middle column of the trading table above, labeled Bids, and your
temporary committee member number will be displayed in the left column, labeled
Buyer ID. All members in your committee see this information [SCREEN 3, WITH
INFO IN TABLE] You may revise your bid at any time simply by entering a new bid,
which must be greater than the current bid listed in the table. [SCREEN 4]. This
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member entered a new bid of 57, so now 57 is the current bid, canceling his earlier
bid. Other members of your committee may, at any time, also submit improving
bids. [SCREEN 5 WITH A NEW BID OF 91]. If one of the other membersbid is
the current bid, you may accept it by clicking on the Sell at Current Bidbutton.
This seals a trade between you and that other member, where you have now traded
away your vote and the other member pays you his or her bid. [SCREEN 6]. Notice
that when you do this your temporary committee member number is entered under
the Seller # column, and the left panel is updated to show that you now have
0 votes and the other member has 2 votes. Your cash holdings are also updated.
[point out on screen] The screen of the other person who just traded will look like
this. [SCREEN 7] The trading period is 2 minutes, however, if there is no activity
for 30 seconds, the trading period will terminate early. This ends the trading phase
of the match.
Now that the trading phase of the match is over, we proceed to the voting stage.
Your screen would now look like [SCREEN 8]. Member 1s screen would look like
[SCREEN 9]. In the voting stage, the trading window is deactivated and the voting
window to the right is activated. At this stage, you simply cast your votes by clicking
on the vote button. These votes are automatically cast as votes for outcome X if you
are in the X group, and are automatically cast as votes for outcome Y if you are in
the Y group.
After you and the other members of your committee have voted, the results are
displayed in the right hand panel, and summarized in the history screen. [SCREEN
10] [Go over the columns of the history screen and explain the Payo¤column that
summarizes what you earned this match: in this case, payo¤ is the same as net prot
from trading.] The other members screen will look like this. [SCREEN 11. Explain
payo¤ screen.]
After all committees are nished, we proceed to the next match, where you are
randomly grouped into new committees, and randomly assigned new outcome values.
Are there any questions before we proceed to the rst practice match? You are not
paid for the practice match, so it has no e¤ect on your nal earnings. The only
purpose of the practice match is to help you understand how the computer interface
works.
[SCREEN 13: Summary slide] [START SERVER]
We will now proceed to the practice match. Remember that you are randomly
assigned to a committee in this match. Similarly, your outcome value, your com-
mittee member number, the other participants in your committee, and your group
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are assigned randomly. Please click on the icon marked VM. Then enter your rst
and last name and click on submit. Then wait. Please dont use the computer while
waiting.
[CONNECT EVERYONE AND START]
Please complete the practice match on your own. Remember, you are not paid
for these practice matches. Feel free to raise your hand if you have any questions.
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO COMPLETE PRACTICE MATCH]
The practice match is now over. Remember, you will not be paid the earnings
from this practice match. Any questions?
If you have any questions from now on, raise your hand, and an experimenter
will come and assist you. We will now begin the 25 paid matches.
[GO TO NEXT MATCH]
Please notice that your cash holdings are reinitialized to 200. This 200 is a loan
that will be subtracted your cash holdings in the last match.
(Play 25 real matches) [After last MATCH, read:]
This is the end of the experiment. You should now see a popup window, which
displays your total earnings in the experiment. Please record this on your payment
receipt sheet, rounding up to the nearest quarter. After you are done, please, click
OK to close the window. Do not close any other windows on your computer and do
not use your computer for anything else. Also enter $10.00 on the showup fee row.
Add the two numbers and enter the sum as the total.
[Write output]
We will pay each of you in private in the next room in the order of your Subject
ID numbers. Remember you are under no obligation to reveal your earnings to the
other players.
Please put the mouse behind the computer screen and do not use either the mouse
or the keyboard at all. Please be patient and remain seated until we call you to be
paid. Do not converse with the other participants or use your cell phone. Thank you
for your cooperation.
Could the person with subject ID number 0 please go to the next room to be paid.
Please bring all your belongings with you, including your payment receipt sheet.
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